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Areopagitic influence and neoplatonic
(Plotinian) echoes in Photius’ Amphilochia:
question 180
Abstract: Focusing on one of the most representative works of Patriarch Photius,
the Amphilochia and precisely on the Question 180, the present study tries to ad-
vance our understanding of Photius’ thought and especially to investigate the
following important question, namely to what extent Patriarch Photius was in-
fluenced by neoplatonism and in which way. In this point lies exactly the contri-
bution of present study, to assess and evaluate the areopagitic and neoplatonic
(mostly Plotinian) elements in the thought of this great theological figure of the
Eastern Church. The analysis of this specific source from Amphilochia shows a
direct influence of the unknown writer of the areopagitic works on Photius
and an indirect transfer of neoplatonic elements (through Dionysius) to the phil-
osophical thinking of the famous Patriarch. So Dionysius Areopagites proves to
be the mediator between neoplatonic and Christian byzantine thought. Although
the mediation of Dionysios between Plotinus and Photius is undisputable, a di-
rect knowledge of the work of Plotinus from Photius cannot be excluded at all.
For, central ideas of the metaphysics of the One such as the idea of unity and the
apophatic method as a proper way for man to approach God are clearly found in
this specific passage of Amphilochia. This result is not only for Photius’ theolog-
ical system but also for the byzantine Theology and Philosophy in general of
great importance. So the study shows something, which was not very well dem-
onstrated so far: Photius’ extensive use not only of Aristoteles but also of Neo-
Platonism and through that: The continuity of the byzantine with the ancient
Greek thought.
Adresse: Dr. Theodoros Alexopoulos, Theologische Fakultät Bern, Längassstr. 49, 3019 Bern,
Schweiz; theodoros.alexopoulos@theol.unibe.ch
Introduction
Patriarch Photius of Constantinople is one of the most important theologians of
the Eastern Church whose writings, especially in the area of trinitarian theology,
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exercised an enormous influence on later figures (e.g., Gregory of Cyprus, Greg-
ory Palamas, and Nilus Cabasilas). Photius’s most significant work, his system-
atic refutation of the Filioque in The Mystagogy of the Holy Spirit, constitutes the
backbone of orthodox criticism toward the theology of the procession as taught
by the Latin Church.
Various important studies have been published in recent years on the Filio-
que issue and on Photius’s contributions to the debate.¹ All of them have focused
on the problem of the procession of the Holy Spirit, stressing Photius’s theolog-
ical objections to the Filioque as it had come to be understood in the Frankish
West.Whereas the majority of these recent studies have centered on Photius’s tri-
nitarian theology, the recent book of Georgi Kapriev, “Philosophie in Byzanz”
(Würzburg 2005), attempted to highlight the influence of philosophical thought,
especially Platonism and Aristotelianism, on both Photius and Eastern Christian-
ity as a whole. For example, Kapriev examined Photius’s analysis of Aristotle’s
categories and Plato’s “Ideas,” offering an insight into Byzantine philosophical
thinking in the ninth century. However, I would argue that Kapriev’s work suf-
fers some significant shortcomings. First, he treats the relation of Photius to Pla-
tonism and Aristotelianism by focusing only on the issues of Platonic “Ideas”
and Aristotle’s categories, and then does so without providing a concrete and
thorough analysis of the sources. In fact, the footnotes contain neither references
to Platonic nor Aristotelian source-material, a fact which makes it impossible to
draw the comparison between Photius and Plotinus, and consequently to discern
the differences or similarities between Greek philosophy and Byzantine Theology
on several key issues (e.g., God as absolute Goodness, God as inapproachable by
human reason). Second, although Kapriev claims in the headline of Paragraph
4.2.5 that he treats the relation of Photius to Platonism and Aristotelianism, he
does not clarify if, and to what extent, Photius’ interpretation of Aristotle’s cat-
egories coincides with that of Plotinus. Kapriev provides us with no conclusions
about the position of Photius concerning the “Ousia” and the “pros ti” compared
with that of Plotinus, who considers Aristotele’s categories to belong strictly to
the sensible world. On the contrary, Plotinus considers the essence to belong
 See the following studies: B. Oberdorfer, Filioque. Geschichte und Theologie eines öku-
menischen Problems. Forschungen zur systematischen und ökumenischen Theologie, . Göttin-
gen , –; P. Gemeinhardt, Die Filioque-Kontroverse zwischen Ost- und Westkirche
im Frühmittelalter. Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte, . Berlin , –; Th. Alexopou-
los, Der Ausgang des Thearchischen Geistes. Eine Untersuchung der Filioque-Frage anhand
Photius’ “Mystagogie des Hl. Geistes”, Konstantin Melitiniotes “Zwei Antirrhetici” und Augustins
“De Trinitate”. Göttingen ; A.E. Siecienski, The Filioque: History of a Doctrinal Contro-
versy. Oxford .
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to the intelligible and places it among the five megista Gene (Γένη) of Plato’s So-
phistes. Third, Kapriev never tells us if, and to what extent, the fundamental
ideas of the Plotinian system (e.g., “Unity”, the apophatic way as the most ad-
equate way of approaching the divine, “the One”) are to be found in Photius’s
philosophical thinking.
My goal in this article is to explore this last important area by uncovering
and evaluating the Neoplatonic elements essential to Photius’s work. In my
view, this task is of great significance for two reasons. First, currently there exists
no study specifically dealing with the appropriation of Neoplatonic thought, and
especially that of Plotinus, in the work of Photius.² Second, in order to under-
stand Photius the theologian we must be aware of how he took advantage of
the ideas and concepts of classic antiquity in order to express the Christian mes-
sage, thereby bringing the two closer to each other. In this respect Photius is con-
sidered to be the true restorer of classical studies in Byzantium, a fact which
makes him differ radically from many other Byzantine scholars. Because of
the multifarious nature of the subject, I will restrict myself to the analysis of
“Question 180” in the Amphilochia, providing both a translation of the primary
text and an elucidation of the Neoplatonic as well the Areopagitic elements of
the passage.
This passage from the Amphilochia has not been chosen by accident. It is
provided to the reader because the Amphilochia occupies an important place
within Photius’s œuvre. Along with the Myriobiblon, it constitutes a rich spring
of theological and philosophical knowledge, which complement one another.³
It is a synthesis, an anthology, including matters scientific, theological, meta-
physical, exegetical, and philosophical, all thoroughly treated, clearly showing
the erudition of the Patriarch.⁴ The majority of the questions treated were written
during the period of the first exile (867–872), a fact ascertained from the con-
 This kind of investigation has already been successfully done in the field of Patristics,
especially with regard to the influence of Plotinus on Saint Gregory of Nyssa. See the Studies of
T. Böhm, Theoria–Unendlichkeit–Aufstieg. Philosophische Implikationen zu De Vita Moysis
von Gregor von Nyssa. Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, . Leiden , and of S.R.C.
Lilla, Neuplatonisches Gedankengut in den Homilien über die Seligpreisungen Gregors von
Nyssa. Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, . Leiden .
 J. Hergenröther, Photius Patriarch von Konstantinopel. Sein Leben, seine Schriften, und das
Griechische Schisma. Regensburg , III .
 Cf. Amph. Q.  (Photii Patriarchae Constantinopolitani Epistulae et Amphilochia, ed. L.G.
Westerink. Leipzig , VI , –): πλὴν ἐκ τῶν προλαβόντων ἡμᾶς ὁσίων καὶ μακαρίων
ἀνδρῶν λαβὰς οὐκ ὀλίγας συλλεξάμενοι, καὶ ἃς ἡ τῆς θείας ῥοπῆς εὐμένεια παρασχεῖν ἡμῖν οὐκ
ἀπηξίωσεν, ταύτας ἐκείναις συνάψαντες. See also Hergenröther, Photius (as footnote  above)
.
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stant references of the Patriarch to the difficulties faced during that period, es-
pecially to the deficit of books and secretaries, as well as to the severity of his
persecution.⁵
The whole treatise is supposedly dedicated to the issues sent by the close
friend of Photius, Amphilochius of Iconium, who allegedly asked the Patriarch
to give answers to various questions. However, a more thorough examination
shows that not all the questions were initially addressed and sent to Amphilo-
chius, leading us to the conclusion that the correspondence between Photius
and his close friend might contain some fictitious elements.⁶ Oftentimes this
genre of literary work, the “dedication” (i.e., writing a kind response to the re-
quest of a friend), was used in ancient Greek and Latin literature when the au-
thor wanted to show his modesty to his audience.⁷ Oftentimes in this genre
someone from the author’s circle is chosen as the addressee with the intention
of honouring him/her or thanking him/her for a kindness.⁸ In any case, this
form of writing gives a special style and character to the Amphilochia, which
rouses the reader’s interest.
The selected passage from Amphilochia has also been chosen with great
care. It is the first among several passages (Questions 180– 184 and 188– 190)
in which Photius deals with subtle theological questions concerning the Trinity
and its ad extra activity towards creation. But why this passage in particular?
From the outset and throughout the text the reader is struck both by the abun-
dant use of neoplatonic-areopagitic terminology as well as the conceptual/phil-
osophical consistency on the major issues. For these reasons alone this passage
is, in my personal assessment, unique and worthy of consideration.
Before providing the translation of the text and going into its analysis, I be-
lieve that it would greatly benefit the reader to make a short reference to the spe-
cific Neoplatonic criteria according to which the Photian text is to be evaluated.
First of all is the notion of “unity.” Unity is the most fundamental condition of
being. It is conceived of as the condition sine qua non for the very reality of all
things. In Enneade VI 9, 1 the cornerstone of Plotinus’s philosophy of unity is
laid: “Every being both this one which is primary and in full sense being and
that one which is said to belong accidently among beings is existent through
 Q.  (V , –Westerink): τοῦ καιροῦ τὸ βαρύτατον καὶ τῶν ὑπογραφέων τὸ ἄπορον.
For further quotations see Hergenröther, ibid. .
 Cf. Hergenröther, ibid. .
 Cf. Amph. Prologus (IV , – Westerink): τῆς σπουδῆς σου τὸ γνήσιον δυσωπηθεὶς τὴν σὴν
ἀφῆκα πρὸς πέρας ἐλθεῖν, ὡς ἤλπισας, αἴτησιν. Καίτοι πολλὰ ἦν, καὶ κράτος εἶχεν, ἃ τὴν ἐμήν
γνώμην ἐκεῖθεν ἀνέστελλεν.
 Cf. H. Görgemanns, Widmung, Der Neue Pauly, / (), –.
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the One. For, what thing could be in existence, if it was not one. Deprived of
unity a being ceases no more to be what it is called.”⁹ In other words, the fact
that something exists is grounded on the fact that it is one. When something
ceases to be one it ceases to exist.¹⁰ This fact further implies that it is impossible
to say what reality is, i.e., to define it, without considering it as a unity.¹¹ Con-
sequently, unity is the condition of predication and definition of being. Without
its character as a unity, being could not be defined at all, and what it is com-
pletely undefined neither is a concrete being, nor does it exist, nor can it be con-
ceived.¹²
Unity appears as a necessary condition both for the predication and defini-
tion of the being, and for its value as an entity. Plotinus detects different degrees
of unity within beings – the greater the unity, the closer the proximity to the One
and the greater the value of the entity.¹³ A being with a greater deal of unity
when compared to another is “more being” (μᾶλλον ὄν).¹⁴ Yet the unity of
every being is, after all, but particular and incomplete, since as a particular lim-
ited mode of coherence it only ‛shares’ in the One.
Moreover, unity is condition for multiplicity since multiplicity appears in its
existence to be a united multiplicity, a unified whole, which is structured from
the variety of its parts. Because of this fact it is contingent. Multiplicity, if it
does not become one, even though it consists of many elements, could not be
named as being.¹⁵ So the notion of multiplicity presupposes the notion of
unity in two ways: the unity of the whole of a multiplicity and the unity of
each of its parts.¹⁶
 Plotinus, Enn.VI ,  (Plotini Opera III ed. P. Henry / H.R. Schwyzer. Oxford –, III
, –: Πάντα τὰ ὄντα τῷ ἑνί ἐστιν ὄντα, ὅσα τε πρώτως ἐστὶν ὄντα, καὶ ὅσα ὁπωσοῦν
λέγεται ἐν τοῖς οὖσι εἶναι. Τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ εἴη, εἰ μὴ ἓν εἴη; Ἐπείπερ ἀφαιρεθέντα τοῦ ἓν ὃ λέγεται
οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκεῖνα.
 Enn. VI ,  (III , – Henry/Schwyzer): οὐδὲν γὰρ ὄν, ὃ μὴ ἕν. See also Plato,
Parmenides, C: ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδέν ἐστιν.
 Cf. Ch. D’Ancona Costa, Plotinus and later Platonic philosophers on the causality ofthe first
principle, in L.P. Gerson (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus. Cambridge , .
 J. Halfwassen, Plotin und der Neuplatonismus. München , –.
 Cf. J. Bussanich, Plotinus’s metaphysics oft he One, in: The Cambridge Companion to
Plotinus (as footnote  above) , with reference to Enn. VI ,  (III , – Henry/
Schwyzer): ἀλλ’ ἔστι μὴ ἧττον ὂν ὑπάρχον ἧττον εἴναι ἕν. In respect to the degrees of being in
the thought of Plotinus see J. Halfwassen, Der Aufstieg zum Einen. Untersuchungen zu Platon
und Plotin. Beiträge zur Altertumskunde, . Stuttgart , –.
 Enn. VI ,  (III , – Henry/Schwyzer).
 Cf. Enn.V ,  (II , – Henry/Schwyzer): μὴ γὰρ ἓν γενόμενον, κἂν ἐκ πολλῶν ᾖ,
οὔπω ἐστὶν ὄν εἴποι τις αὐτό.
 Halfwassen, Plotin und der Neuplatonismus (as footnote  above) .
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The character of unity inherent to every multiplicity as a whole consisting of
unities implies a radical transcendent principle, which must be conceived as out-
side all plurality and compositeness, as a pure unity.¹⁷ Pure unity means nega-
tion of any kind of definition, which could drag it into multiplicity and conse-
quently into a certain limitation. Pure unity means, above all, absolute
simplicity, implying total absence of every kind of distinction or division be-
tween the concrete thing and its definition. This means total absence f any onto-
logical structure and negation of every positive predication for it. Such a predi-
cation has a dual structure since it always says something about something and
thus, in that respect, cannot meet the absolute simplicity of the One. So the nec-
essary conclusion must be drawn – there can be no defining the One.¹⁸ This
leads us to Plotinus’ highest metaphysical axiom, namely that the One or
Good is ineffable. In fact,, Plotinus even appears to be hesitant about attributing
“Good,” “is” or even “One” to it because of his deep conviction that every kind of
human discourse, even negative language, remains unsatisfactory to describe it
in its nature.¹⁹ It is also no being, otherwise the predication “One” would be at-
tributed also to another thing. In reality, no name is proper for it; and if indeed
somebody must name it, he will fittingly name it in general the “One”, but not as
if it was firstly something else and afterwards the “One.”²⁰
 Cf. Enn. V ,  (II , – Henry/Schwyzer): Δεῖ μὲν γάρ τι πρὸ πάντων εἶναι ἁπλοῦν
τοῦτο καὶ πάντων ἕτερον τῶν μετ’ αὐτό, ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ ὄν, οὐ μεμιγμένον τοῖς ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ, καὶ πάλιν
ἕτερον τρόπον τοῖς ἄλλοις παρεῖναι δυνάμενον, ὂν ὄντως ἕν, οὐχ ἕτερον ὄν, εἶτα ἕν, καθ’ οὗ
ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἓν εἶναι, οὗ μὴ λόγος μηδὲ ἐπιστήμη, ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐπέκεινα λέγεται εἶναι τῆς οὐσίας –
εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἁπλοῦν ἔσται συμβάσεως ἔξω πάσης καὶ συνθέσεως καὶ ὄντως ἕν, οὐκ ἂν ἀρχὴ εἴη –
αὐταρκέστατον τε τῷ ἁπλοῦν εἶναι καὶ πρῶτον ἁπάντων· … τὸ δὴ τοιοῦτον ἓν μόνον δεῖ εἶναι. –
There must be something simple before all things, and this must be other than all the things
which come after it, existing by itself, not mixed with the things which derive from it, and all the
same able to be present in a different way to these other things, being really one, and not a
different being and then one; it is false even to say that it is one, and there is “no concept or
knowledge” of it; it is indeed also said to be “beyond being.” For if it is not to be simple, outside
all coincidence and composition, it could not be a first principle; and it is the most self-
sufficient, because it is simple and the first of all … A reality of this kind must be one alone
(Translation according to Bussanich, Plotinus’s metaphysics of the One, as footnote  above,
).
 Cf. Halfwassen, Plotin und der Neuplatonismus (as footnote  above) –.
 Cf. F. Schroeder, Plotinus and language, in: The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus (as
footnote  above), –.
 Enn. VI ,  (III , – Henry/Schwyzer): τὸ δὴ πρὸ τούτου θαῦμα τοῦ ἕν, ὃ μὴ ὄν
ἐστιν, ἵνα μὴ καὶ ἐνταῦθα κατ’ ἄλλου τὸ ἕν, ᾧ ὄνομα μὲν κατὰ ἀλήθειαν οὐδὲν προσῆκον, εἴπερ
δὲ δεῖ ὀνομάσαι, κοινῶς ἂν λεχθὲν προσηκόντως ἕν, οὐχ ὡς ἄλλο, εἶτα ἕν.
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This exaltation of the apophatic method as the most adequate way of ap-
proaching God, while at the same time clearly implying a latent agnosticism
in the name of transcendence,²¹ has greatly influenced so called Christian Pla-
tonism in the figure of Ps. Dionysius, who introduced the notion of supreme ab-
straction (ὑπεροχική ἀφαίρεσις)²² in order to outline the status of God beyond
being. But although the absolute transcendence of God is conceived by Diony-
sius in the same way as Plotinus in terms of denying being and affirming
God’s existence beyond being (μὴ ὂν ὡς πάσης οὐσίας ἐπέκεινα),²³ the negation
of any kind of positive thought about God is not a priori excluded, especially in
relation to His beneficence, providence, and action towards creation.²⁴ Because
of this fact, it is possible to make positive predications for God while at the same
time denying all positive notions in regards to Him stating that He is nothing
among beings.²⁵ The possibility of the kataphatic method when describing the
outwards action of God towards creation, balanced with the apophatic way, rad-
ically differentiates Christianity from Neoplatonism, which clearly gives priority
to the second.
After having made these clarifications and provided the reader with the
main criteria according to which the text is to be evaluated, I will first quote
the Photian text in Greek and then provide my own translation. The text is
drawn from the edition of L.G.Westerink, Photii Patriarchae Constantinopolita-
ni Epistulae et Amphilochia, vol. V, Leipzig 1986.
 Cf. Halfwassen, Aufstieg (as footnote  above) .
 Cf. De Divinis Nominibus II , ed. B.R. Suchla. Patristische Texte und Studien, . Berlin
, ,.
 Cf. Div. Nom. I  (,  Suchla) and II  (,–, Suchla): … καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐστι τὸ
εἶναι καὶ οὐκ αὐτὸς τοῦ εἶναι … Cf. Enn.VI ,  (III , Henry/Schwyzer): ἔστι δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ
“ἔστιν”; VI ,  (III ,  Henry/Schwyzer): οὐκ ἔστι (sc. τὸ ἕν).
 Cf. Div. Nom.V  (, – Suchla): οὐ γὰρ ἐκφράσαι τὴν αὐτοϋπερούσιον ἀγαθότητα …
ἐπαγγέλεται (sc. ὁ λόγος) … ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκπεφασμένην ἀγαθοποιὸν πρόνοιαν, ὑπεροχικῶς ἀγα-
θότητα καὶ πάντων ἀγαθῶν αἰτίαν ὑμνεῖ (What I say does not promise to express the goodness,
which in itself transcends being … but praises the revealed well-doing providence as goodness
in a supreme manner and as cause of all goods); V  (, – Suchla): Τοσοῦτον δὲ
ὑπομνήσωμεν, ὅτι τῷ λόγῳ σκοπὸς οὐ τὴν ὑπερούσιον οὐσίαν, ᾗ ὑπερούσιος, ἐκφαίνειν,
ἄῤῥητον γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ ἄγνωστον ἐστι καὶ παντελῶς ἀνέκφαντον καὶ αὐτὴν ὑπεραῖρον τὴν
ἕνωσιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν οὐσιοποιὸν εἰς τὰ ὄντα πάντα τῆς θεαρχικῆς οὐσιαρχίας πρόοδον ὑμνῆσαι ( But
i will put also in mind that the purpose of my account is not to reveal that essence, which is
beyond being, for this is something beyond words, something unknown and wholly unrevealed,
something above unity itself. What i wish to do is to praise the being-grounding procession of
the absolute divine source of being into the total domain of being).
 Cf. Div. Nom. V  (,  Suchla) : διὸ καὶ πάντα αὐτοῦ καὶ ἅμα κατηγορεῖται, καὶ οὐδὲν
ἔστι τῶν πάντων.
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Text and translation
Περὶ θεολογίας ζητήματα τῷ αὐτῷ
Ἄρρητον μὲν τὸ θεῖον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄληπτον, διότι μηδ’ ἔστιν μηδ’ ἐπινοίαις ψιλαῖς
προϋφεστηκότα τινὰ λαβεῖν δι’ ὧν ὁ λόγος προϊὼν τὴν γνῶσιν καὶ κατάληψιν
τοῦ μακαρίου ἐκείνου καὶ ἀφθέγκτου παράσχοι θεάματος˙ ἄρρητον δὲ καὶ ἄλη-
πτον ὄν, ἀπὸ τῶν ὑστέρων ὅμως, ὥσπερ ἀπό τινος τῆς ἐκεῖθεν εἰ καὶ ἀμυδρᾶς
5 ἀπαυγῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς κατιούσης καὶ δι’ αὐτῶν ἡμῖν τὴν διάνοιαν ἐνατενίζειν πρὸς
τὸ ἀμήχανον ἐκεῖνο κάλλος παρασκευαζούσης, δυνατόν ἐστί τινας θεοπρεπεῖς
φαντασίας εἰσδέξασθαι. καθ’ ὃν γὰρ τρόπον οἱ ζόφῳ παχεῖ περικεχυμένῳ ἐγκαθή-
μενοι βραχεῖάν τινα τῶν ἡλιακῶν ἀκτίνων καὶ ἀμυδρὰν λαμπηδόνα παραδέχον-
ται, οὕτως οἱ τῷ σαρκίῳ περικεκλεισμένοι ἐκ τῆς ἀπαυγῆς ἐκείνης τοῦ νοητοῦ
10 ἡλίου εἰς ἔννοιάν τινα καὶ φαντασίαν θεοπρεπῆ ὥσπερ ἀπό τινος κατοπτρικοῦ
μηχανήματος τοῦ τε πόθου καὶ τῆς συζητήσεως σκιοφανεῖς ἀκτῖνας ἕλκοντες,
ἀνάγεσθαι δύνανται. ὃν μὲν οὖν διασῴζει λόγον ὁ ἥλιος ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς, τοιαύ-
την ἂν περὶ τοῦ θείου δύναταί τις ἔννοιαν ὡς ἐξ εἰκόνος ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς δοῦναι
καὶ λαβεῖν.
15 Ἀλλὰ γὰρ καὶ ἐξ ἀποφάσεως τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων εἰς θεωρίαν ἀναγόμεθα τῆς
ἐξῃρημένης τῶν ὄντων οὐσίας τε καὶ θεότητος˙ ὃ γὰρ μηδέν ἐστιν τῶν πάντων,
κρεῖττον δὲ τοῦ παντός, τοῦτ’ ἂν εἴη θεός, ὃς προήγαγέν τε ἐκ μὴ ὄντων εἰς τὸ
εἶναι τὸ πᾶν καὶ τῆς τῶν προηγμένων διαμονῆς καὶ ἐναρμονίου κινήσεως τὴν
πρόνοιαν ἔχει.
20 Καὶ πρό γε τούτων, ὅτι ἔστιν θεός, κοινῇ πᾶσιν ἐγκατέσπαρται ταῖς ἀνθρω-
πίναις διανοίαις, τῆς ἐκεῖθεν αὐγῆς ὡς δι’ ἐμφάσεων διανιστώσης ἡμῶν τὸν νοῦν
καὶ φωταγωγούσης, εἰ καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι τί ποτέ ἐστιν θεός, ἀλλ’ οὖν γε μὴ
ἀγνοεῖν ὅτιπερ ὅλως ἐστίν. εἰ γὰρ πλῆθος ἅπαν, εἴτε τὴν τοῦ συνεχοῦς ὀνομα-
σίαν δεχόμενον, εἴτε τῷ διωρισμένῳ περιγραφόμνον, ὥσπερ εἰς ἄπειρον δύναται
25 τέμνεσθαι καὶ σκεδάζεσθαι, οὕτω καὶ πρὸς ῥοὴν καὶ διαφθορὰν ἀποφέρεσθαι,
μετοχῇ πάντως ἑνός τινος ἐξήρθη τοῦ μὴ ταῦτα παθεῖν αὐτίκα τοῦ προελθεῖν,
ἀλλὰ μονῆς ἀπολαύειν καὶ συνοχῆς˙ μετοχῇ δ’ ἑνός, οὐ τοῦ κυρίως καὶ ὑπερου-
σίου ἑνός, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τμητὰ καὶ σκεδαστὰ οὐδὲ ῥεούσης ἂν ὅλως εἴησαν καὶ φθει-
ρομένης φύσεως, ἀλλ’ ἑνὸς μετοχῇ ὃ δὴ σκιάν τις ἀμυδρὰν εἰπὼν τοῦ κυρίως καὶ
30 ὑπερουσίου ἑνὸς ἐγγὺς ἂν εἰκασίας γένοιτο τῆς μηδὲν ἀνατυπουμένης τολμηρόν.
τοιοῦτον δέ ἐστιν τὸ παρ’ ἡμῖν ἕν, οὗ καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ὥσπερ εἴρηται μετέχον τμη-
τὸν μέν ἐστιν καὶ σκεδαστὸν καὶ ῥευστόν, οὔπω δὲ τῇ προόδῳ συνδιερρύηκεν,
ὥσπερ οὐδὲ διατέτμηται. τάυτῃ τοι καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ πλῆθος, ἀόριστον ὂν καὶ ἀνεί-
δεον τῇ γε φύσει τῇ οἰκείᾳδι’ ἐκείνου τε περιορίζεται καὶ εἰδοποιεῖται˙ τετρὰς
35 γὰρ καὶ ἑπτὰς καὶ δεκὰς καὶ τριακὰς τοῦ παρ’ ἡμῖν ἑνός εἰσιν ὥσπερ ἰνδάλματα
καὶ προβολαί, τὸ πλῆθος ἑνοποιοῦσαι καὶ εἰδοποιοῦσαι καὶ περιορίζουσαι.
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Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ εἰ τὸ ἡνωμένον ἅπαν οὐχ ἑαυτὸ ἑνοῖ, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἑνότητι ἥνω-
ται, καὶ αὐτὸ ἄρα τῇ τοῦ ἑνὸς μετοχῇ τὸ ἡνωμένον ἔχει σῳζόμενον, ἑνὸς δὲ κἀν-
ταῦθα οὐ τοῦ κυρίως καὶ ὑπερουσίου ἑνός, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ εἴρηται τοῦ ἀπολαύοντος
40 τῆς ἐκεῖθεν σκιᾶς.
Ἔτι δὲ εἰ ἔστιν μὲν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι λαβεῖν τὸ ἄρχον καὶ τὸ ἀρχόμενον, καὶ αὐτὸ
δὲ τὸ ἄρχον τὴν τοῦ ἀρχομένου τάξιν ὑποδυόμενον, δῆλον ὅτι τὸ ἄρχον οὐκ ἂν
εἴη κυρίως ἄρχον, διὰ τοῦ ἄρχεσθαι καθαιρούμενον τῆς ἀρχῆς˙ εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἔστιν
τις ὑπερανῳκισμένη καὶ ἄναρχος ἀρχή, ἐξ ἧς τὸ ἄρχον τὴν ἀμυδρὰν τοῦ εἰκάσμα-
45 τος δεξάμενον σκιὰν τὴν σχέσιν εἵλκυσεν καὶ τὴν ὀνομασίαν τῆς ἀρχῆς.
Καὶ ἄλλως δέ, ὥσπερ ἐστὶν τελευταῖόν τι λαβεῖν ἀρχόμενον μόνον, οὐκ
ἄρχον δέ, οὕτως ἐστὶν ἀναθεωρεῖν ὡς ἔστιν τις ὑπερτάτη καὶ ἐξῃρημένη τῶν
ἄλλων ἁπάντων ἄναρχος ἀρχή, ἥτις ἂν ἐφαρμόζουσα εἴη τῇ ὑπὲρ νοῦν καὶ
ὑπὲρ ἔννοιαν πᾶσαν θεότητι καὶ θεαρχίᾳ.
50 Εἰ δέ ἐστιν ἐν τῇ τῶν ὄντων φύσει καὶ ἀγαθὸν εὑρεῖν, μᾶλλον δὲ πολλὰ καὶ
ποικίλα τὰ ἀγαθά (ὃ γὰρ μὴ ἀπολαύει τινὸς ἀγαθότητος, ἀλλ’ εἰς ἄκρατον ἥκει
κακίας, οὐδ’ ὑφεστάναι ὅλως δύναται˙ σκεδασθείη γὰν ἂν αὐτίκα καὶ διαφθαρείη,
εἴπερ ἡ φθορὰ καὶ ὁ σκεδασμὸς τοῦ κακοῦ), δῆλον ὡς ἔστιν τὰ μὲν μᾶλλον, τὰ δ’
ἧττον μετέχοντα τἀγαθοῦ. εἰ δέ ἐστιν τὰ μὲν μᾶλλον, τὰ δὲ ἧττον μετέχοντα
55 τἀγαθοῦ, οὐκ ἀμφίβολον οὐδ’ ὅτι ἀπὸ τῶν μετασχόντων κατὰ πρώτην ἢ κατὰ
δευτέραν ἢ καὶ κατ’ ἄλλην τινὰ τάξιν ἀγαθύνεται τὰ μεταλαμβάνοντα˙ πάντα
δ’ ὅμως ὑπερανῳκισμένης τινὸς ἀγαθότητος χορηγίᾳ καὶ ἀπολαύσει τὴν τοῦ ἀγα-
θοῦ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς χάριν φέρει. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἔστιν τις ἄρα ὑπεράγαθος ἀγαθότης, ἐξ
ἧς τοῖς ἀγαθυνομένοις ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθύνεσθαι κατὰ ἀναλογίαν τῶν δεχομένων
60 παρέχεται δωρεά.
Ἐκ τοίνυν τῶν εἰρημένων φανερόν ἐστιν δυνατὸν εἶναι θεωρίαν θηρᾶσαί
τινα, ὅτι τε ἔστιν θεός, καὶ οὗτος ὑπερούσιον ἓν καὶ ὑπεράρχιος ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑπε-
ράγαθος ἀγαθότης ὡς πηγὴ ἀγαθότητος. καὶ ἄλλων δ’ ὥσπερ ἰνδαλμάτων
τινῶν καὶ εἰκασμάτων, καθάπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἴρηται, δυναμένων ἀπὸ τῶν ὑστέρων
65 παραληφθῆναι, δι’ ὧν ἐστιν εἰς τὸ ἀμήχανον ἐκεῖνον καὶ ἀνέκφραστον κάλλος
τῆς ὑπερουσίου καὶ ὑπερφυοῦς θεότητος ἐνατενίζειν, μάλιστά γε καὶ ὅτι μηδὲ
χαλεπὸν διὰ τῆς προειρημένης μεθόδου τοιαῦτα συλλέγειν, πρός γε τὴν παροῦ-
σαν χρείαν καὶ τὴν συνέχουσαν ἡμᾶς τῶν ὑπογραφέων ἐρημίαν καὶ τῶν βιβλίων
τὴν αἰχμαλωσίαν ἱκανά σοι καὶ ταῦτα.
Theological questions, to the same recipient
The deity is as well as incomprehensible, because one cannot by bare reasoning
even grasp any pre-existing things whereby the mind by advancing might pro-
vide us with knowledge and understanding of that blessed and unutterable vi-
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sion. But though it is ineffable and incomprehensible, yet it is possible from the
posterior things, as from some radiance, however dim, from that source descend-
ing on them, and by them preparing our mind to gaze upon that unattainable
beauty, to receive some notions worthy of God. In the same way that those
who sit enshrouded in deep darkness receive some slight and dim illumination
from the sun’s rays, those enclosed in the flesh may, by drawing shadowy rays
from their desire and (through) joint inquiry, as from some reflective device,
be led up by that ray of the intelligible sun to a concept and thought worthy
of God. The position, which the sun keeps permantly among perceptible things,
a concept of this kind could be given and received of the Deity among intelligible
things, as by way of an image.
On the other hand, by the negation of all beings we are led up to the under-
standing of the essence and godhead which surpasses beings. For what is not
one of all the beings, but is superior to the universe, that is God, who both
brought forth the universe from not being to being, and exercises providence
over the preservation and harmonious movement of what he brought forth.
Even prior to that, the existence of God is implanted generally in the minds
of all men, the ray from that source raising up and illuminating our mind as by
representations, even though not so as to know what God might be, yet not so as
to be unaware that he exists at all. For everything which constitutes a great
quantity or number (a plurality), whether it is described as continuous or circum-
scribed by what defines it, can be as it were infinitely divided and fragmented,
and thus swept to dissolution and destruction, by participation in a certain unity
it is surely lifted up so as not to suffer these things as soon as it appears, but
enjoys permanence and continuity. Participation in unity however is not partic-
ipation in the absolute and transcendent One, since they would be neither divis-
ible or capable of fragmentation nor would they at all be of a nature liable to
dissolution and destruction; rather it is participation in a unity which, if one
called it a dim shadow of the absolute and transcendent One, one might be
near to a speculation that does not represent something rash. Such is the
unity we are considering, where the participating plurality, as we have said, is
liable to division, fragmentation and dissolution, but is not dissolved at its com-
ing forth, as it is not divided up. In this way the plurality itself, while indefinite
and formless in its proper nature, is defined and given form by that (unity); four,
seven, ten and thirty are namely a kind of form and extension of the one we are
dealing with, giving unity, form and definition to the plurality.
Likewise every united thing does not unite itself, but is united by the unity,
and what is united is preserved by participation in the one; here again, it means
participation, not in the absolute and transcendent One, but as we have said, it
enjoys the shadow coming from it.
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Further, it is possible to find among beings that which is origin and that
which has an origin, and the origin itself is subject to the role of having been
originated, then plainly what originates is not the absolute origin, since having
been originated is (immediately) deposed of (its rank) being an origin. But if so,
there is an Origin which resides above and is without origin, from which the ori-
gin that receives the dimly outlined shadow derives the status and title of origin.
Yet again, as it is possible to find something (among beings) in the lowest
order, that only has an origin but is no origin so it is possible to conceive that
there is some principle superior and beyond all other things, a principle without
principle which would be applicable to the Deity and to divine origin which tran-
scends mind and every thought.
If it is possible in the nature of beings also to find good, or rather many and
varied goods (for what enjoys no goodness, but has reached undiluted evil, can-
not exist at all; it would immediately be fragmented and destroyed, if indeed evil
means destruction and fragmentation) – then plainly some things participate
more, other less in the good. But if there are some that participate more, others
less, in the good, then there can be no doubt that among those participating,
those receiving the good in first, second and third degree, all receive the gift
of good in themselves by the provision and enjoyment of some Goodness
which dwells above. If so, then there is some supreme Goodness, which is be-
yond Goodness by which the gift of goodness is provided freely to those receiv-
ing goodness in due order.
From what has been said it is clearly possible to seek for some idea that God
exists, and that he is the transcendent One and Origin beyond Origin, supremely
good, the Good as fountain of goodness; because other (mental) images and
comparisons, as was said at the beginning, being able to drawn from posterior
things, whereby it is possible to gaze upon that unattainable and indescribable
beauty of the transcendent and supreme Deity, may these remarks are enough for
you especially since it is not very difficult to compile such things using the same
method, given the present necessity and the constraint we suffer through the ab-
sence of secretaries and the lack of access to books.
Analysis
Already at the beginning of his treatment, with the questions on “Theology,”
Photius clarifies the status of the divine, stressing its ineffable and incomprehen-
sible nature, a view which is widely seen not only in the writings of Plotinus,²⁶
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but also in the Areopagitic works²⁷ and those of Saint Gregory of Nyssa.²⁸ He also
emphasizes the fact that human nature does not contain the capacity of under-
standing the precise being of God by means of pure reasoning (ἐπινοίαις
ψιλαῖς).²⁹ The question that is immediately raised is: If God is absolutely un-
knowable and ineffable, how we can talk about him, form concepts, or enunciate
propositions about His nature? Photius sees no way for men to approach God un-
less he gives indications of His presence. For this reason he points out that al-
though God is ineffable and inconceivable, he gives us signs from the things
he has made, as from some radiance, however dim, so that we may form
some kind of concept of Him and contemplate His unspeakable and extraordina-
ry beauty (ἀμήχανον κάλλος).³⁰ Here, the reader encounters the expression ἐκ
τῶν ὑστέρων. A very similar expression is also found in Plotinus namely that
 “ἄρρητον τῇ ἀληθείᾳ” Cf. Enn.V , (II ,  Henry/Schwyzer);V , (II , Henry/
Schwyzer); VI, (III , – Henry/Schwyzer); VI ,  (III , – Henry/Schwy-
zer): οὐδὲν ὄνομα κατὰ ἀλήθειαν αὐτῷ (sc. Ἓν) προσῆκον. On this adjective see J. Whitaker,
Ἄρρητος καί ἀκατονόμαστος, in: Platonismus und Christentum, Festschrift für H. Dörrie. JbAC
Ergänzungsband, . Münster , – [= idem, Studies in Platonism and Patristic
Thought. London , XII].With regard to incomprehensibility: “οὐ μὴν αὐτὸ λέγομεν … οὐδὲ
νόησιν ἔχομεν αὐτοῦ”. Cf. Enn. V , (II , – Henry/Schwyzer).
 Cf. Div. Nom. XIII  (, Suchla): ἄρρητος φύσις; ibid. I  (,): ἀνωνυμία; I 
(,): ἄκλητον καὶ ὑπερώνυμον; I  (,): ἀνώνυμον. Further Div. Nom. I  (,), IX 
(,): ἀπερίληπτον; I  (,): ἄληπτος; VII  (,): ἀκατάληπτον.
 Cf. In canticum canticorum , ed. H. Langerbeck. Gregorii Nysseni Opera, . Leiden ,
,: ἄρρητος φύσις; Eun. III/V , ed.W. Jaeger. Gregorii Nysseni Opera, . Leiden , ,
–: ἄρρητον τε καὶ ἀνερμήνευτον; Eun. (, Jaeger): ἀκατονόμαστον; Eun. (,
Jaeger): ἀνεκφώνητον; Eun. I  (GNO, . , – Jaeger): ἄφραστον τε καὶ ἀνεκ-
φώνητον καὶ πάσης τῆς διὰ λόγων σημασίας ἀνώτερον, ἓν ὄνομα γνωριστικὸν τῆς ἰδίας ἔχοντα
φύσεως, τὸ μόνον αὐτὸν ὑπὲρ πᾶν εἶναι ὄνομα; Cf. also Cant.  (Gregorii Nysseni Opera, . ,
Langerbeck): ἄληπτον; Cant.  (Gregorii Nysseni Opera, . ,); Cant.  (Gregorii Nysseni
Opera, . ,): ἀκατάληπτον; De Virginitate , ed. J.P. Cavarnos. Gregorii Nysseni Opera, /.
Leiden , , : τὸ καὶ λόγῳ ἄρρητον καὶ νοήματι ἀκατάληπτον.
 In respect to the notion of Epinoia see: T. Kobusch, Die Epinoia – das menschliche Be-
wusstsein in der antiken Philosophie, in L. Karfikova/S. Douglas/J. Zachuber, ed., Gregory of
Nyssa Contra Eunomium II. Proceedings of the th international Colloquium on Gregory of
Nyss. Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, . Olomouc, September –, ) –; B.
Studer, Der theologiegeschichtliche Hintergrund der Epinoiai-Lehre Gregors von Nyssa,
ibid. –; Ch. Apostolopoulos, Die Rolle der Epinoia nach Eunomius und Gregor und die
theologisch-philosophischen Hintergründe, ibid. –; E. Moutsopoulos, Epinoia et
imaginaire chez Grégoire de Nysse, ibid. –, and J. Demetracopoulos, Glossogony or
epistemology? The stoic character of Basil of Caesarea’s and Eunomius’ epistemological notion
of ἐπίνοια and its misinterpretation by Gregory of Nyssa, ibid. –.
 Cf. Plato, Politeia VI A; Plotinus, Enn.V ,  (II ,  Henry/Schwyzer); Greg. Nyss.,
De Virginitate. , ed. J.P. Cavarnos. Gregorii Nysseni Opera, /. Leiden , , –.
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of ἐκ τῶν ὕστερον. Both formulations, although they are not verbally identical,
are based on the same reasoning and intend to emphasize that everything that is
said about God derives from that which comes after Him: Τὸ μὲν οὖν εἶναι, ὡς
λέγομεν ἐκεῖνο εἶναι, ἐκ τῶν μετ’ αὐτό.³¹ [The being, whatever we say about
it, that it exists, derives from that which comes after it. That means that the con-
tent of every speech about God derives not from God Himself, but from things
that come from Him:³² ὥστε περὶ αὐτοῦ μὲν λέγειν, αὐτὸ δὲ μὴ λέγειν. Καὶ γὰρ
λέγομεν, ὃ μὴ ἔστιν˙ ὃ δέ ἐστιν, οὐ λέγομεν˙ ὥστε ἐκ τῶν ὕστερον περὶ αὐτοῦ
λέγομεν.³³ [So, we speak about it (the One), but we do not declare it itself.
And indeed we say what it is not; but what it (really) is, we do not say; so we
speak about it from that which comes after it].
Every speech about the divine may discuss it, but never disclose it,³⁴ for in
its transcendent nature it is absolutely unspeakable, unknowable, and incom-
prehensible.³⁵ God may become the object of our discussion, but this discussion
is very limited as long as it is conducted from the perspective of beings: Ἐκ τῶν
ὄντων ἁπάντων ἐναρμονίως ὑμνεῖται καὶ ὀνομάζεται.³⁶ This line of thinking is
dominant in Dionysius as well. Dionysius teaches us that God is praised and
named appropriately by the sum total of beings, making clear that affirmative
theology and praise are possible. In this they indicate not what God really is,
but rather something of God that is knowable.³⁷ This possibility of naming
God and forming concepts about Him is neither contingent nor arbitrary. It is
a product of the restricted perceptive and spiritual faculties of human beings
who experience God’s extroversion, his opening towards the world by extending
his goodness.³⁸ This extroversion reveals a firm, transcendent beam, granting en-
lightenment proportionate to each being.³⁹ Human beings are only able to form
 Enn. VI ,  (III , – Henry/Schwyzer).
 G. Huber, Das Sein und das Absolute. Studien zur Geschichte der ontologischen Problematik
in der spätantiken Philosophie. Basel , .
 Enn. V ,  (II , – Henry/Schwyzer).
 Schroeder, Plotinus and language (as footnote  above) .
 V ,  (II , – Henry/Schwyzer):Ἢ λέγομεν μέν τι περὶ αὐτοῦ, οὐ μὴν αὐτὸ λέγομεν
οὐδὲ γνῶσιν οὐδὲ νόησιν ἔχομεν αὐτοῦ.
 Div. Nom. I  (, – Suchla); ibid. I  (, Suchla): ἐκ πάντων τῶν αἰτιατῶν
ὑμνητέον.
 Cf. Ep. I (ed. A.M. Ritter, in PTS , Berlin , , –, ): Καὶ αὐτὸν ἑώρακεν, ἀλλά
τι τῶν αὐτοῦ τῶν ὄντων καὶ γινωσκομένων.
 Cf. Div. Nom. IV  (, –,  Suchla): τἀγαθὸν ὡς οὐσιῶδες ἀγαθὸν εἰς πάντα τὰ ὄντα
διατείνει τὴν ἀγαθότητα.
 Cf. Div. Nom. I  (, – Suchla): Οὐ μὴν ἀκοινώνητόν ἐστιν καθόλου τἀγαθὸν οὐδενὶ
τῶν ὄντων, ἀλλ’ ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ μονίμως τὴν ὑπερούσιον ἱδρῦσαν ἀκτῖνα ταῖς ἑκάστου τῶν ὄντων
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concepts and allowed to propose names of God on the basis of this enlighten-
ment. God can only be approached if God himself takes the initiative to extend
himself to beings. This Areopagitic position coincides totally with the views of
Photius, who says that it is possible to form concepts, notions, and names
that can fittingly be ascribed to God only from a dim enlightenment that
comes down to us. Exactly the same view is to be found in later Neoplatonism
(e.g., in Proclus), who probably inspired the work of Dionysius. From this self-
sharing that comes down to us, says Proclus, we ascribe to God a variety of
names such as the Good and the One.⁴⁰ That is to say: Every name we ascribe
to God is an interpretation of his action towards us. His action ad extra gives
us the spur to speak about Him. In this context we should also not forget Pho-
tius’s and Dionysius’s indebtedness to the Cappadocian Church fathers vis-à-vis
the condescension and descent (ἀπαυγῆς… κατιούσης) of the divine to the realm
of beings, which occurs without loss of transcendence (a concept shared by both
Dionysius and Photius). This view is to be found in Basil of Caesarea’s famous
formulation: Ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἐνεργειῶν γνωρίζειν λέγομεν τὸν θεὸν
ἡμῶν, τῇ δὲ οὐσίᾳ αὐτῇ προσεγγίζειν οὐχ ὑπισχνούμεθα. Αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐνέργειαι
αὐτοῦ πρὸς ἡμᾶς καταβαίνουσιν, ἡ δὲ οὐσία αὐτοῦ μένει ἀπρόσιτος.⁴¹ (“We do
indeed say that we know our God from his operations-energies, but we are not
enabled to draw near the essence itself; for, while his energies come down to
us, his essence abides inaccessible”).
The second basic element that demonstrates the essential connection be-
tween Photius and Plotinian-Areopagitic thought refers to the path of negation
that re-charts the ascent of finite beings that seek to return to their single source
and origin through an inherent and creaturely impulse. More specifically, it re-
flects the movement of human thought from diversity to simplicity, from partic-
ipation to presence, from limitation to transcendence, from the manifold towards
unity, with the intention of contemplating (εἰς θεωρίαν) the essence and deity
which is beyond all beings.⁴² In the speculation of Plotinus, the absolute tran-
ἀναλόγοις ἐλλάμψεσιν ἀγαθοπρεπῶς ἐπιφαίνεται … See also C. Schäfer, Philosophy of Dio-
nysius the Areopagite. An introduction to the structure and the content of the treatise on the
Divine Names. Philosophia antiqua, . Leiden/Boston , –.
 In Platonis theologiam II , ed. H.D. Saffrey / L.G.Westerink. Paris , , –: τὸ μὲν
οὖν ἓν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐκ τῆς εἰς ἅπαντα τὰ ὄντα καθηκούσης ἀπ’ αὐτοῡ δόσεως ἐπ’ ἀυτὸ
μετήγομεν. On this issue see also Th. Alexopoulos, Inwieweit ist die Synthese zwischen
Neuplatonismus und Christentum in der philosophisch-theologischen Position des Dionysius
Areopagita gelungen? Jahrbuch für Religionsphilosophie  () –.
 Ep.  (to Amphilochius of Iconium), PG , B.
 Cf. F. O’Rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius and the metaphysics of Aquinas. Studien und Texte zur
Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, 32. Leiden 1992, 15–16.
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scendence of the One is conceived of as the denial of every name of God. The
clear priority of the path of negation can clearly be seen in the constant incita-
tion of Plotinus: ἄφελε πάντα⁴³ [remove – take away every (name) from the One].
This statement emphasizes the transcendence of everything through the nega-
tion of everything.⁴⁴ Plotinus insists on adding nothing to the One, as this
would otherwise create the danger of being double.⁴⁵ Every addition to the
One erases its absolute simplicity.⁴⁶ Even the name of “the One,” which we as-
cribe to it, has a negative character, for it is simply the negation in respect to plu-
rality.⁴⁷ The way of negation has a concrete goal – to lift the One from the sphere
of beings. This is why negation stands above all else. While affirmative expres-
sions designate the One by means of definitions applied to beings, the negative
one reveals its supremacy over the beings.⁴⁸
Based on the prior apophatic tradition of the church fathers, and influenced
by Neoplatonic views, Dionysius attaches great significance to the method of
apophasis (yet without neglecting the value of kataphatic speech!). Therefore
he states: “We do not even attribute the name of Goodness to it as appropriate;
but with a desire⁴⁹ to think and speak of its ineffable nature we consecrate to it
the most sacred of names. Here we are in agreement with those who proclaim
God; but since we leave the truth of the matter far behind, they also have chosen
the ascent through negation.”⁵⁰ “Negations concerning divine things are true
 Enn. V ,  (II ,  Henry/Schwyzer).
 Halfwassen, Aufstieg (as footnote  above) .
 Cf. Enn.V ,  (II , – Henry/Schwyzer): Χρὴ τοίνυν ἐνταῦθα ᾆξαι πρὸς ἕν, καὶ μηδὲν
αὐτῷ ἕτι προσθεῖναι, ἀλλὰ στῆναι παντελῶς δεδιότα αὐτοῦ ἀποστατῆσαι μηδὲ τουλάχιστον μηδὲ
εἰς δύο προελθεῖν. See also Enn.VI ,  (III , – Henry/Schwyzer) and Proclus, Theol.
Plat. II  (, – Saffrey/Westerink): καὶ ὡς μένειν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀποφάσεων προσήκει τῷ
Πλάτωνι πειθομένους καὶ μηδὲν τῷ ἑνὶ προστιθέντας˙ ὃ γὰρ ἂν προσθῇς ἐλαττοῖς τὸ ἕν, καὶ οὐχ
ἓν αὐτὸ λοιπὸν ἀποφαίνεις ἀλλὰ πεπονθὸς τὸ ἕν.
 Cf. Proclus, Theol. Plat. II  (, – Saffrey/Westerink): ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ τῶν ὄντων
ἁπάντων αἴτιον ὑπὲρ οὐσίαν πᾶσαν καὶ χωριστὸν ἁπάσης οὐσίας, καὶ οὔτε οὐσίαν οὔτε προ-
σθήκην τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχον· ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη πρόσθεσις ἐλάττωσίς ἐστι τῆς ἁπλότητος καὶ τοῦ ἕν. (It
is thus the cause of all being, above any being and completely separate from any being; It
contains being not as being and not as addition. For such an addition is a reduction of simplicity
and unity). Plotinus gives great emphasis to the simplicity of the One: See Enn.V ,  (II ,
 Henry/Schwyzer): τὸ ἁπλούστατον; V ,  (II ,  Henry/Schwyzer): τὸ ὄντως
ἁπλοῦν; V ,  (II ,  Henry/Schwyzer): τὸ πάντη ἁπλοῦν.
 Cf. Enn. V ,  (II , Henry/Schwyzer): ἄρσιν ἔχει πρὸς τὰ πολλά.
 Cf. Huber, Sein (as footnote  above) .
 Cf. Photius, Amph.  (V , Westerink): τοῦ τε πόθου καὶ τῆς συζητήσεως.
 Div. Nom. XIII  (,–, Suchla): Καὶ οὐδὲ αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς ἀγαθότητος ὡς ἐφαρ-
μόζοντες αὐτῇ προσφέρομεν, ἀλλὰ πόθῳ τοῦ νοεῖν τι καὶ λέγειν περὶ τῆς ἀῤῥήτου φύσεως
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(ἀληθεῖς), but affirmations are unsuitable (ἀνάρμοστοι) for the hidden nature of
the ineffable… Therefore we may celebrate the divine realities with true nega-
tions.”⁵¹ Dionysius goes one step further than the prior tradition of the church
fathers when he follows the Plotinian concept of the One and declares the inad-
equacy even of negation to express the supremacy of God. Applying even nega-
tive attributes to God is an activity of the human intellect. But God is beyond rea-
son and consequently beyond affirmation and negation as functions of reason.
So we must choose to transcend rational thought, which implies apophatic
speech as well. God’s absolute transcendence defies even the apophatic path,
a principle affirmed by Dionysius when he denies his denials: “There is no
speaking of it, (sc. the divine) neither name nor knowledge of it. Darkness
and light, error and truth – it is none of these. It is beyond assertion and denial.
We make assertions and denials of what is next to it, but never of it, for it is both
beyond every assertion being the perfect and unique cause of all things, and, by
virtue of its preeminently simple and absolute nature, free of every limitation,
beyond every limitation; it is also beyond every denial.”⁵² The most appropriate
way to express moving beyond the bounds of both kataphasis and apophasis is
thus the way of the “Theology of Supremacy” or of “Transcending” (ὑπεροχικὴ
ἀφαίρεσις).⁵³ This kind of aphaeresis states the hyper-having, namely the having
something in excessive measure. It connotes a sense of complete separation or
total removal of positive properties (that are attributed to God as being their
cause) such as knowledge, motion, life etc. from God interpreting these removed
properties hyperochically (in a sense of overflowing superabundance) rather
than privatively.⁵⁴ To name God as ὑπερούσιον, ὑπεράγαθον, ὑπεράγνωστον
etc. is to remove these names (in their non hyper-prefixed form) from God in a
ἐκείνης τὸ τῶν ὀνομάτων σεπτότατον αὐτῇ πρώτως ἀφιεροῦμεν. Καὶ συμφωνήσοιμεν ἂν κἀν
τούτῳ τοῖς θεολόγοις, τῆς δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων ἀληθείας ἀπολειφθησόμεθα. Διὸ καὶ αὐτοὶ τὴν διὰ
τῶν ἀποφάσεων ἄνοδον προτετιμήκασιν … Trans. from O’Rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius (as foot-
note  above) .
 Cf. CH II  (ed. G. Heil, in PTS , Berlin , , –); II  (ibid., ).
 De mystica theologia  (, – Ritter): οὔτε λόγος αὐτῆς ἐστιν οὔτε ὄνομα οὔτε γνῶσις˙
οὔτε σκότος ἐστὶν οὔτε φῶς οὔτε πλάνη οὔτε ἀλήθεια˙ οὔτε ἐστὶν αὐτῆς καθόλου θέσις, οὔτε
ἀφαίρεσις, ἀλλ’ τῶν μετ’ αὐτὴν τὰς θέσεις καὶ τὰς ἀφαιρέσεις ποιοῦντες αὐτὴν οὔτε τίθεμεν
οὔτε ἀφαιροῦμεν˙ ἐπεὶ καὶ ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν θέσιν ἐστὶν ἡ παντελὴς καὶ ἑνιαία τῶν πάντων καὶ ὑπὲρ
πᾶσαν ἀφαίρεσιν ἡ ὑπεροχὴ τοῦ πάντων ἁπλῶς ἀπολελυμένου καὶ ἐπέκεινα τῶν ὅλων. Trans.
from J. Fischer, The theology of dissimilarity: negation in Pseudo-Dionysius. Journal of Religion
 () .
 See footnote .
 See T. Knepper, Not not: the method and logic of Dionysian negation. American Catholic
Philosophical Quarterly / () –, –.
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hyperochic manner. Toremove hyperochically is therefore to equate not-property
with hyper-property. To remove hyperochically is to remove apophatically.⁵⁵
Such kind of speech merely attempts to point out that God in his absolute tran-
scendence is totally independent of His subsequents and superior to them as
their cause.
Photius unswervingly maintains this line of reasoning concerning the abso-
lute supra-essentiality (ὑπερουσιότης) of God through negations. He emphatical-
ly stresses the point when he designates the deity as something that “is nothing
of all things” (μηδέν ἐστι τῶν πάντων).⁵⁶ This expression has Photius most prob-
ably drawn from Dionysios Areopagites.⁵⁷ Here we should point out that this ex-
pression is abundantly used by the later neoplatonists Proclus and Damascius,
on whom the Dionysian author is more likely to have drawn than on Plotinus.
Irrespective of this fact one should focus on the conceptual concistency of the
byzantine Theology of the ninth century with the views of the early Neoplaton-
ism. For, Plotinus also conceives of the One as the supreme cause transcendent
in respect to its participants, subsisting apart from them and prior in respect to
them. The One is totally transcendent, regardless of its universal presence that
results from its causality (οὐδὲν τῶν πάντων, ἀλλὰ πρὸ τῶν πάντων).⁵⁸ In re-
gards to negative expression, this does not mean that the One does not exist
at all or that it is nothing. Instead, negative expression is indicative of the su-
premacy of the One (ὑπεροχῆς σημαντικόν).⁵⁹ Without a clear definition, it not
only shows clearly that the One can neither be defined nor named, but also
that it is beyond any definition and any name.⁶⁰
The fourth and the fifth elements are to be found between the lines 233, 25–
45 in the text of the critical edition, and refer to the notions of multiplicity and
unity. According to Photius, multiplicity has the following basic characteristics:
1) It is confined within certain limits (τῷ διωρισμένῳ περιγραφόμενον).
 See ibid., .
 Cf. Amph.  (V, , –).
 Cf. Div. Nom.V  (, Suchla): διὸ καὶ πάντα αὐτοῦ ἅμα κατηγορεῖται καὶ οὐδὲν ἔστι τῶν
πάντων.
 Enn. III ,  (PO I, , – Henry/Schwyzer). See also V ,  (II , Henry/
Schwyzer); μηδὲν τῶν πάντων;V ,  (II , Henry/Schwyzer): οὔτε τι τῶν πάντων; V , 
(II , – Henry/Schwyzer): πρὸ πάντων. See C. Costa, Plotinus and later Platonic
philosophers on the causality of the first principle, in: The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus (as
note  above), . For further quotations see Halfwassen, Aufstieg (as footnote  above)
. In respect to this issue see also: W. Beierwaltes, Proklos Grundüge seiner Metaphysik
(Frankfurt ) –.
 So Proclus In Parm. , . Cf. Halfwassen, Aufstieg (as footnote  above) .
 Cf. Halfwassen, ibid. .
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2) It can be divided, scattered, and consequently be led to destruction (τμη-
τόν, σκεδαστόν, ρευστόν… οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὴν φθορὰν ἀποφέρεσθαι). This possi-
bility implies the radical ontological deficiency of its nature.
3) Unity is its basic condition. By participating in it, multiplicity can main-
tain its coherence (συνοχή) and thus remain in existence.
4) Multiplicity partakes of unity, but not of what exists primarily and is su-
praessential. Such unity it is beyond participation and beyond any kind of nu-
meration. The unity of which the multiplicity partakes is a faint shadow (σκιά
τις ἀμυδρά) of the primary unity, which transcends being (τοῦ κυρίως καὶ ὑπε-
ρουσίου ἑνός).
All these elements can be better understood and evaluated if they are exam-
ined in light of Plotinus’ thinking. For Plotinus, multiplicity is characterized by
fundamental ontological deficiency:⁶¹ Δεῖ μὲν γὰρ ἱκανώτατον ὂν ἁπάντων καὶ
αὐταρκέστατον καὶ ἀνενδεέστατον εἶναι˙ πᾶν δὲ πολὺ καὶ μὴ ἓν ἐνδεὲς ἐκ πολ-
λῶν γενόμενον. Δεῖται οὖν αὐτοῦ ἡ οὐσία ἓν εἶναι˙ τὸ δὲ οὐ δεῖται ἑαυτοῦ˙
αὐτὸ γάρ ἐστι. Καὶ μὴν πολλὰ ὂν τοσούτων δεῖται, ὅσα ἔστι, καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν
ἐν αὐτῷ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ὂν καὶ οὐκ ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ ἐνδεὲς τῶν ἄλλων ὑπάρχον
καὶ καθ’ ἓν καὶ κατὰ τὸ ὅλον τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐνδεὲς παρέχεται. Εἴπερ οὖν δεῖ τι
αὐταρκέστατον εἶναι, τὸ ἓν εἶναι δεῖ τοιοῦτον ὂν μόνον οἶον μήτε πρὸς αὑτὸ
μήτε πρὸς ἄλλο ἐνδεές εἶναι.⁶² [For, It (sc. the One) must be the most entire of
all things and most self-sufficient and least in need; all that is plural and not
one is needy since it became (one) from many. So its essence needs the one in
order to be unity. On the other side, the One does not need himself, for it is
what it is. Indeed, being many, it needs just as much as it is, and being each
of the things in it along with the other things, and not being of itself in need
of the others, it provides both individually and all together such as is needed.
If therefore something needs to be self-sufficient, it must be the One, being
only such as is in want neither in itself nor in relation to another].
Plotinus draws our attention to the inherent deficiency of every multiplicity
in two ways: 1) Multiplicity needs the presence of its instances in order to be
what it is, namely, a whole that consists of smaller parts. 2) Each of these
parts does not possess independent existence; these parts do not simply coexist,
but each stands in need of the existence of all other parts and has its being only
within the whole.⁶³ The nature of multiplicity is thus deeply dependent on a cer-
 Cf. K.H. Volkmann-Schluck, Plotin als Interpret der Ontologie Platos. Philosophische Ab-
handlungen, . Frankfurt , .
 Enn. VI ,  (III ,–, Henry/Schwyzer).
 Cf. Volkmann-Schluck, Plotin (as footnote  above) –. See also Halfwassen, Auf-
stieg (as footnote  above) .
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tain unity.Without this unity it loses its coherence and cannot continue to exist.
This fact itself completely implies its ontological deficiency. Furthermore, it im-
plies the existence of a totally self-sufficient and independent principle from
which stems every being. This must be only the absolute One, for it contains
in itself no kind of multiplicity and its existence depends on nothing else except
itself.⁶⁴ In full contradiction to the absolute unity of the One, the Manifold ap-
pears to be ontologically lacking, for it is dependent on unity, namely on the
unity of its parts. Unity is therefore considered to be the main condition for
being. But how are the ideas of a “manifold unity” and that of the supra-essen-
tial “One” connected? Plotinus clarifies this question by observing the reality of
beings. Every being exists only through the One.⁶⁵ “For, nothing is existent that is
not one.”⁶⁶ This means that the essence of being is founded on its being-in-unity.
Being only exists as long as it is one, and the fact that it exists is based on the
fact that it is one.⁶⁷ If every being did not participate in the unity, that is to say, it
was not one, it would not exist at all; it would disappear from being. So every
being is what it is only through this, namely, that it is one. It owes its essential
property of being to its character as unity.⁶⁸ However, the being is not by itself
one, but only through participation;⁶⁹ it has the character of a posterior, and
not of an absolute and primary unity.⁷⁰ It bears in it the image, i.e., the trace,
of the transcendent One (ἄγαλμα ἢ ἴχνος τοῦ ἑνός).⁷¹ Through its nature it pro-
vides an indication for the One, it is similar (ὅμοιον)⁷² to the One, it is manifes-
tation of the One, but it is not the One itself, for it is not absolute unity.⁷³ It is
only a faint shadow of the supra-essential One. The One must be itself (as abso-
lute simple One) without any relation, existing only for itself if It is to be man-
 Ibid. ,  with reference to Enn. VI ,  (III , – Henry/Schwyzer).
 Cf. Enn. VI , (III , Henry/Schwyzer): πάντα τὰ ὄντα τῷ ἑνί ἐστιν ὄντα.
 Enn. VI , (III , – Henry/Schwyzer): οὐδὲν γὰρ ὄν, ὃ μὴ ἕν.
 Halfwassen, Aufstieg (as footnote  above) .
 Ibid.  with reference to Huber, Sein (as footnote  above) .
 Cf. Amph. (V ,  Westerink): μετοχῇ … ἑνός. Cf. Enn. V ,  (II , Henry/
Schwyzer): πολλὰ ὄντα μετοχῇ ἑνὸς ἕν. Cf. also Dion. Areop., Div. Nom. XIII  (, –
Suchla): οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔστι τῶν ὄντων ἀμέτοχον τοῦ ἑνός.
 Cf. Plato Soph. a; Parm. c, a. Cf. Halfwassen, Aufstieg (as footnote  above)
.
 Enn. III ,  (I , Henry/Schwyzer): ἴχνος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ; see also V ,  (II ,
Henry/Schwyzer); V ,  (II ,  Henry/Schwyzer): ἄγαλμα τὸ πρῶτον.
 Enn. V ,  (II ,  Henry/Schwyzer).
 Cf. Halfwassen, Aufstieg (as footnote  above) , .
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ifested in something else. There is no unum coadunatum without the Unum su-
perexaltatum.⁷⁴
This important view becomes clearer when Photius provides us with the ex-
ample of number. What is number? It is a multiplicity consisting of unities, or a
composition of unities.⁷⁵ Every numeral unity is an image, i.e., a projection, of
the transcendent One.⁷⁶ While the unity is the beginning of every number (in
every number the unity is the constructive element), the transcendent One can-
not be considered as a numerable (ἐνάριθμον), as the principle of every number.
If it would be a numerable principle, then any additional unique definition
would immediately cause a duality, of which every part would be only one,
but not the absolutely simple One.⁷⁷ For as the parts of the duality both should
be posterior to the simple One, a fact that would carry the consequence that the
simple and first One, by Its entry into the duality, would be transformed into
something that was originated or derived and consequently no longer the simple
One.⁷⁸ The absolutely simple One is thus not commensurable with any number. It
belongs neither to the arithmetic sequence nor to any process of numeration or
calculation.⁷⁹ Accordingly, the One cannot be added to another one or to any
other number, for It is beyond any notion of number. In the last chapter of De
Divinis Nominibus, Dionysius will point out, in full accordance with the view
of Plotinus, that the supra-essential One defines being-as-one (ἓν ὄν) and
every number as well, and that It itself is principle, cause, number and order
of the number and of every being.⁸⁰ It is before every one (πρὸ παντὸς ἑνός)
and beyond the one-being (καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν ὄν).⁸¹
 Ibid. , : ἓν μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων and ἓν αὐτὸ καθ’ ἑαυτό.
 Cf. Amph. Q.  (V , – Westerink).
 Cf. Amph. Q.  (V , – Westerink).
 Cf. Enn.V ,  (II , – Henry/Schwyzer): Ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ ἐν τοῖς τοῦ ποσοῦ ἀριθμοῦ πρὸς
τὸ ἓν τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτῶν ἀπομιμουμένη τὴν ἐν τοῖς προτέροις ἀριθμοῖς φύσις πρὸς τὸ ὄντως ἓν
οὐκ ἀναλίσκουσα τὸ ἓν οὐδὲ κερματίζουσα τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει, ἀλλὰ δυάδος γενομένης ἔστι
μονὰς ἡ πρὸ τῆς δυάδος, καὶ οὐχ ἡ ἐν τῇ δυάδι μονὰς ἑκατέρα οὐδ’ ἑτέρα ἐκείνη.
 Cf. D. Roloff, Plotin. Die Großschrift III  – V,  – V,  – II . Untersuchungen zur antiken
Literatur und Geschichte, 8. Berlin 1970, 109.
 Ibid. –. See Enn.V ,  (II  – Henry/Schwyzer): Χρὴ τοίνυν ἐνταῦθα ᾆξαι
πρὸς ἕν, καὶ μηδὲν αὐτῷ ἔτι προσθεῖναι, ἀλλὰ στῆναι παντελῶς δεδιότα αὐτοῦ ἀποστατῆσαι
μηδὲ τουλάχιστον μηδὲ εἰς δύο προελθεῖν. Εἰ δὲ μή, ἔσχες δύο, οὐκ ἐν οἷς τὸ ἕν, ἀλλὰ ἄμφω
ὕστερα. Οὐ γὰρ θέλει μετ’ ἄλλου οὔτε ἑνὸς οὔτε ὁποσουοῦν συναριθμεῖσθαι οὐδ’ ὅλως
ἀριθμεῖσθαι˙ μέτρον γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ οὐ μετρούμενον, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δὲ οὐκ ἴσον, ἵνα σὺν αὐτοῖς˙ εἰ
δὲ μή, κοινόν τι ἔσται ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν συναριθμουμένων, κἀκεῖνο πρὸ αὐτοῦ˙ δεῖ δὲ μηδέν.
 Cf. Div. Nom. XIII  (, – Suchla).
 Cf. Div. Nom. XIII  (, –,  Suchla).
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The next important element that can be drawn from this passage refers to
the notion of Arché. By observing beings, Photius postulates a relation between
something that is origin and something that is originated (ἄρχον καὶ
ἀρχόμενον).⁸² This distinction within beings provides us with an indication of
the existence of a supreme and transcendent cause, free from all finitude of
Being (ὑπερτάτη καὶ ἐξῃρημένη ἁπάντων),⁸³ whose nature transcends the limi-
tations that define how we conceive things. Photius characterizes this as unori-
ginated origin (ἄναρχος ἀρχή).⁸⁴ The adjective ἐξῃρημένη⁸⁵ is widely used in the
Areopagitic works, including the use of the so-called via superlativa with respect
to the notion of Arché. God is a principle beyond principle (ὑπεράρχιος ἀρχή),⁸⁶ a
principle that transcends being (ὑπερούσιος ἀρχή).⁸⁷ As mentioned before, the
prefix ὑπὲρ actually has a negative meaning and it is used to overcome oppo-
sites, such as Arché and Telos. If every name ascribed to God is predicated by
transference of human notions, from the creatures to the Creator, and if nothing
from these names we attribute to God is worthy of Him because of the limited
character of human language, then anything predicated of Him can be set
 Cf. Amph. Q.  (V, ,  Westerink).
 Cf. Amph. Q.  (V , Westerink).
 Cf. Amph. Q.  (V , Westerink).
 Cf. Div. Nom. I  (, Suchla); I  (, Suchla); CH III  (, Heil); CH IV  (,
 Heil).
 Cf. Div. Nom. I  (,  Suchla); XI  (,  Suchla); CH VII  (,  Heil); IX  (PTS ,
,  Heil); X  (,  Heil); Ep.  (,  Ritter).
 Cf. Div. Nom. XI  (, Suchla); CH VIII  (, Heil); IX  (,  Heil); XIV (,
Heil).
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forth as an example – i.e., it has the function of metaphor.⁸⁸ Thus God is called
Essence or Arché, but strictly speaking He is neither Essence nor Arché. He is
called by these Names from the horizon, from the perspective of beings. This
means that the notions of Arché or cause are usable and predicable only with
the reservation and caution that they are true “from us,” i.e., from our point
of view, since they simply express the relation of the Other towards God and
not God Himself.⁸⁹ “For God himself is related to nothing, but everything else
is related to Him.”⁹⁰ God also remains beyond any notion of causality and is
completely transcendent. This view is expressed by Neoplatonism with a variety
of phrases that deny any notion of “principle of being” for the One. So the One is
called τὸ πρὸ ἀρχῆς,⁹¹ προαίτιον,⁹² ἀναιτίως αἴτιον,⁹³ ὑπὲρ αἴτιον.⁹⁴
By the time one finishes Photius’ passage, the reader is struck by the full co-
incidence of his views with those of the Platonic-Areopagitic tradition in respect
to the notion of evil. This tradition insists on God’s utter Goodness. As undivided
Goodness, He cannot even be the source of any evil in what He creates.⁹⁵ This
tenet prevails in Photian thought, in which we can recognize many Areopagitic
elements, especially from Dionysius’ treatise On the Divine Names.
 Cf. M.T. Tomasic, The Logical Function of Metaphor and Oppositional Coincidence in the
Pseudo-Dionysius and Johannes Scottus Eriugena. Journal of Religion  () –: .
 Cf.W. Beierwaltes, Denken des Einen. Studien zur neuplatonischen Philosophie und ihrer
Wirkungsgeschichte. Frankfurt , . See also idem, Identität and Differenz. Philosophische
Abhandlungen, . Frankfurt , –. See Halfwassen, Aufstieg (as footnote  above)
.
 Enn. III , (I , – Henry/Schwyzer): περὶ οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ τὸ πρῶτον, τὰ ἄλλα δὲ περὶ
αὐτό. See Halfwassen, Aufstieg (as footnote  above) .
 Cf. Enn. V .  (II , – Henry/Schwyzer).
 Cf. Proclus, In Parm. , ; Theol. Plat. II , ,  (Saffrey/Westerink).
 Cf. Proclus, Theol. Plat. II , ,  (Saffrey/Westerink).
 Cf. Proclus, In Parm. ,; ibid. , –: πάντα γὰρ ὡς αὐτοῦ (sc. τοῦ ἑνὸς) πρὸς
αὐτὸ διὰ τούτων ἀποφασκόμενα … οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀρχή, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, οὐδὲ μέσον, οὐδὲ τέλος.
See Halfwassen, Aufstieg (as footnote  above) .
 Cf. Plato, Politeia ab: “Βut this very thing, the patterns or norms of right speech about the
gods, what would they be? – Something like this, I said. – The true quality of God we must
always surely attribute to him whether we compose in epic, melic, or tragic verse. – We must. –
And is not God of course good in reality and always to be spoken of as such? – Certainly. – But
further, no good thing is harmful, is it? – I think not. – Can what is not harmful harm? – By no
means. – Can that which does not harm do any evil? – Not that either. – But that which does no
evil would not be cause of any evil either? – How could it? – Once more, is the good beneficent?
– Yes. – It is the cause, then, of welfare? – Yes. – Then the good is not the cause of all things, but
of things that are well it the cause: of things that are ill it is blameless. – Entirely so”, etc. Trans.
by Schäfer, Philosophy (see footnote  above) .
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In the text in question we recognize conceptual as well verbal coincidences,
such as the concept that the nature of evil is to disperse and destroy the sub-
stance of things:
Photius
Ὃ γὰρ μὴ ἀπολαύει τινὸς ἀγαθότητος, ἀλλ’ εἰς ἄκρατον ἥκει κακίας οὐδ’ ὑφεστάναι ὅλως
δύναται˙ σκεδασθείη γὰρ ἂν αὐτίκα καὶ διαφθαρείη, εἴπερ ἡ φθορὰ καὶ ὁ σκεδασμὸς τοῦ
κακοῦ.⁹⁶
What enjoys no goodness, but has reached undiluted evil, cannot exist at all; it would im-
mediately be fragmented and destroyed, if indeed evil means destruction and fragmenta-
tion.
Dionysius
Τὸ κακόν, ᾖ κακόν, οὐδεμίαν οὐσίαν ἢ γένεσιν ποιεῖ, μόνον δὲ κακύνει καὶ φθείρει… τὴν
τῶν ὄντων ὑπόστασιν.⁹⁷
Evil qua evil produces no being or generation, but only corrupts and destroys… the being of
things that are.
Φύσις γὰρ τῷ ἀγαθῷ τὸ παράγειν καὶ σώζειν, τῷ δὲ κακῷ τὸ φθείρειν καὶ ἀπολύειν.⁹⁸
It is the nature of the good to produce and preserve, that of evil to destroy and dissolve.
Τὸ γὰρ πάντη ἄμοιρον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, οὔτε ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἔσται.⁹⁹
What is entirely without participation in the good would also not exist.
The second idea, which inevitably draws our attention, is that of being lacking
goodness, which is considered to be unable to preserve its existence within
the being and finally as non-being. As non-being, it is characterized as evil
both by Photius and Dionysius. Both ascribe to it a parasitic existence, which
they define as “parhypostasis,”¹⁰⁰ a bare “by-being”, i.e., something which is
not a principal hypostasis existing on its own and for its own sake, but depend-
ent upon the existence of other things, namely, of the good.¹⁰¹ In reality, evil is
 Amph. Q.  (V, , – Westerink).
 Div. Nom. IV  (, –,  Suchla).
 Div. Nom. IV  (, – Suchla).
 Div. Nom. IV  (, –,  Suchla).
 Cf. Div. Nom. IV .  (,; , Suchla); Amph. Q.  (VI/ , – West-
erink): ἡ κακία χῶραν οὐκ ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀρετῇ παρυφίσταται.
 Cf. Schäfer, Philosophy (see footnote  above)  with reference to J. Opsomer/C.
Steel, Evil without a cause: Proclus’ doctrine on the origin of evil, and its antecedents in
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acknowledged as a privation of goodness, a falling short of goodness, a lessen-
ing of good (ἥττονος ἀγαθοῦ παρουσία)¹⁰² and, in a moral sense, a weakness, a
deficiency and a lack (ἔλλειψις) of the perfection of the inherent virtues (ἐρημία
τῆς τῶν οἰκείων ἀγαθῶν τελειότητος).¹⁰³ According to Photius, the less someone
practices the virtues and thus neglects good deeds, the more he falls into the
worst things, i.e., he gives more space to the evil.¹⁰⁴ That means that the status
of evil is purely accidental, it depends only on free will, which enables beings to
choose and accomplish their way of perfection, while it also enables these same
beings rationally freely to deny (the prospect of) characteristic perfection with
which their proper nature provides them.¹⁰⁵
Regardless of its accidental existence, evil remains a reality in the world
with a strong effect on the behaviour of beings. It is noteworthy that despite
the destructive nature of evil acknowledged by both Christian and Platonic writ-
ers, somehow a positive, even pedagogical, aspect is also detected in it. More
precisely, it is through the experience of evil that the good becomes more
clear and apparent to us. In this point the conceptual coincidence between Pho-
tius and Plotinus is more than astonishing:
… ἡ ἀδικία ἡμῶν διαμαρτυρομένη καὶ κηρύττουσα τὴν δικαιοσύνην αὐτοῦ ἐνεφάνισεν, ἀλλ’
ὃν τρόπον εἴρηται τὴν ἀγαθότητα διὰ τῆς κακίας ἐμφανεστέραν καθίστασθαι.¹⁰⁶
Γνῶσις γὰρ ἐναργεστέρα τἀγαθοῦ ἡ τοῦ κακοῦ πεῖρα οἷς ἡ δύναμις ἀσθενεστέρα, ἢ ὥστε
ἐπιστήμῃ τὸ κακὸν πρὸ πείρας γνῶναι.¹⁰⁷
The third important element concerns the idea of proportionality (ἀναλογία) in
the participation of Goodness. All beings do not participate in the same way
or to the same degree in the Good, a fact that determines the quality of their re-
lation to God:
Hellenic philosophy, in Th. Fuhrer/M. Erler (eds.), Zur Rezeption der hellenistischen Philoso-
phie in der Spätantike. Stuttgart/Leipzig , –: .
 Cf. Div. Nom. IV  (, Suchla).
 Cf. Div. Nom. IV  (,. – Suchla).
 Cf. Amph. Q.  (IV, , – Westerink): ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τὸν πράττοντα τὴν ἀρετήν, ἐπειδὰν
ταύτην εἰλικρινῶς πράττῃ, ἀνενέργητον αὐτὸν πρὸς τὴν κακίαν εἶναι, ἀμελήσαντα δὲ τῶν καλῶν
ἔργων πρὸς τὰ χείρονα κατενεχθῆναι, οὐδεὶς ἂν διαμφισβητήσει.
 Schäfer, Philosophy (see footnote  above)  with reference to Dionysius.
 Amph. Q.  (V, , – Westerink).
 Enn. IV ,  (II , – Henry/Schwyzer).
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Τὸ γὰρ πάντη ἄμοιρον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ οὔτε ὂν οὔτε ἐν τοῖς οὖσι, τὸ δὲ μικτὸν διὰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐν
τοῖς οὖσι καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς οὖσι καὶ ὄν, καθ’ ὅσον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μετέχει. Μᾶλλον δὲ τὰ
ὄντα πάντα κατὰ τοσοῦτον ἔσται μᾶλλον καὶ ἦττον, καθ’ ὅσον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μετέχει.¹⁰⁸
For that which totally lacks a share in the Good has neither being nor a place in existence,
whereas that which has a composite nature owes whatever place it has among beings to the
Good, and its place among them and the extent of its being are directly proportionate to the
share it has of the Good. In other words, all beings will have a different degree of being
according to their share in the Good).¹⁰⁹
Analogy safeguards the hierarchy and the order within the class of beings: Εἰ γὰρ
μὴ ἀναλόγως ἑκάστῳ τἀγαθόν παρῆν, ἦν ἂν τὰ θειότατα καὶ πρεσβύτατα τὴν τῶν
ἐσχάτων ἔχοντα τάξιν. Πῶς δὲ καὶ ἦν δυνατὸν μονοειδῶς πάντα μετέχειν τοῦ
ἀγαθοῦ, μὴ πάντα ὄντα ταὐτῶς εἰς τὴν ὁλικὴν αὐτοῦ μέθεξιν ἐπιτήδεια;¹¹⁰
[For, if the Good was not present to each being according to their measure,
then the most divine and honored (beings) would have belonged to the lowest.
But how could it be possible for all beings to participate uniformly in the Good,
since they are not all in the same way suitable for full participation in the Good].
The concept of analogy¹¹¹ embraces the whole of creaturely being, declaring
the ordained degree of participation in God, the degree of proximity to Him. This
is merely a process any being has to go through in order to reach its fulfillment.
Here too Dionysius and Photius are indebted to their predecessors, especially
Gregory of Nyssa.¹¹² They are indebted to him and also to Plotinus for the idea
that God is the inexhaustible source (πηγή)¹¹³ of Goodness, who grants
 Div. Nom. IV  (, – Suchla). Cf. Photius Amph. (V ,  – ,Westerink).
 Translated by Schäfer, Philosophy (see footnote  above) . See also idem, Unde
malum. Die Frage nach dem Woher des Bösen bei Plotin, Augustinus und Dionysius.Würzburg
.
 Div. Nom. VI  (, – Suchla).
 In respect to the notion of analogy in Dionysius Areopagites see: A. Golitzin, Et introibo ad
altare dei. The mystagogy of Dionysius Areopagita, with special reference to its predecessors in
the eastern Christian tradition. Analekta Blatadon, . Thessalonike , –.
 Cf. De hominis opificio, PG , C: κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναλογίαν; ibid. D: ἀναλόγως ἡ
τοῦ ὄντως κάλλους κοινωνία διέξεισι. See also De infantibus praemature abreptis, ed. H.
Hörner. Gregorii Nysseni Opera, III/. Leiden , , –: γνῶσις κατὰ τὸ ἐγχωροῦν ἐστιν
ἡ μετουσία; ibid. (, –): οἱ διὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐν τῷ τῇδε βίῳ τὰς ψυχὰς θρέψαντες … πρὸς
λόγον τῆς ἐνυπαρχούσης αὐτοῖς ἕξεώς τε καὶ δυνάμεως τῆς θείας τρυφῆς μεταλήψονται, ἢ
πλειόνος ἢ ἐλάττονος κατὰ τὴν παροῦσαν ἑκάστου δύναμιν τῶν προκειμένων μετέχοντες.
 Cf. Greg. Nyss., De Beatitudinibus , ed. J.F. Callahan. Gregorii Nysseni Opera,VII/. Leiden ,
, ; Plotinus, Enn. III , (I , Henry/Schwyzer); VI ,  (III , – Henry/Schwy-
zer).
Th. Alexopoulos, Neoplatonic (Plotinian) and Areopagitic echoes 25
(χορηγεῖν – παρέχειν)¹¹⁴ his gifts (δωρεά)¹¹⁵ to beings so that they may become
good.
This last idea clearly shows a strong tendency of the Christian and Neopla-
tonic traditions to conceive of God, not as a reality totally separated from his
products, but rather as extroversive, extending His Goodness to creatures com-
mensurate with their capacity or incapacity to grasp Him. Although ineffable
and inconceivable, we should still be allowed to name Him to the best of our
ability (or inability) according to His meaning for us.¹¹⁶ But how can this be pos-
sible? This possibility is based on the clear signs (σύμβολα) and traces (ἴχνη)¹¹⁷ of
His presence that God gives us, not in order to show us what He is, but rather to
prevent ignorance of His existence.¹¹⁸ The Neoplatonic-Areopagitic echoes are
more than recognizable and give clear evidence of the essential unity and coher-
ence between Eastern Christianity and ancient Greek thought.¹¹⁹ This is all the
more true for Byzantine thought.
If it can be demonstrated that Neoplatonism is connected both to early Chris-
tianity and to early Byzantine thought on several important issues, it can legit-
imately be asked how Photius would have turned this inherited tradition to
his advantage. One could also ask whether Photius impoverishes, transcends,
or amplifies the ideas of his predecessors. What are the broader implications
of these connections for Photius’s and later neoplatonic thought?
 Amph. (V , . Westerink). Cf. Greg. Nyss., Beat.  (, Callahan): τὸ πᾶσι τοῖς
οὖσι τὸ εἶναι παρεχόμενον. Plotinus, Enn. IV , (II , – Henry/Schwyzer): τοῦ πᾶσι τὸ
ἀγαθόν … χορηγοῦντος; VI ,  (III , – Henry/Schwyzer): ὁ χορηγὸς ἀληθινῆς ζωῆς.
 Amph. (, ). Cf. Dion. Areop., Div. Nom. XI  (, – Suchla): αὐτοαγαθότητα καὶ
αὐτοθεότητα λέγοντες εἶναι τὴν ἀγαθοποιὸν καὶ θεοποιὸν ἐκ θεοῦ προεληλυθυῖαν δωρεάν καὶ
αὐτοκάλλος τὴν καλλοποιὸν χύσιν.
 Schäfer, Philosophy (see footnote  above)  with reference to Dion. Areop. and Plo-
tinus. Cf. Div. Nom.VII  (, – Suchla): καὶ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ καὶ νόησις καὶ λόγος καὶ ἐπιστήμη
καὶ ἐπαφὴ καὶ αἴσθησις καὶ δόξα καὶ φαντασία καὶ ὄνομα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα, καὶ οὔτε νοεῖται
οὔτε λέγεται οὔτε ὀνομάζεται. – Of him, there is concept, reason, understanding, touch, per-
ception, opinion, imagination, name, and many other things. On the other hand he cannot be
understood, words cannot contain him, and no name can lay hold of him. – Enn. V ,  (,
– Henry/Schwyzer): ἀλλὰ ἡμεῖς ταῖς ἡμετέραις ὡδῖσιν ἀποροῦμε ὅ τι χρὴ λέγειν, καὶ
λέγομεν περὶ οὐ ῥητοῦ, καὶ ὀνομάζομεν σημαίνειν ἑαυτοῖς θέλοντες, ὡς δυνάμεθα.
 Cf. Amph.  (V , Westerink) Cf. also Greg. Nyss., Cant.  (, Langerbeck);
Eun. II  (, Jaeger); Plotinus, Enn.V , (II , – Henry/Schwyzer); III , (I
, – Henry/Schwyzer); Proclus Plat. Theol. II  , – (Saffrey/Westerink): πᾶσι
γὰρ ἐνέσπειρεν ὁ τῶν ὅλων αἴτιος τῆς ἑαυτοῦ παντελοῦς ὑπεροχῆς συνθήματα, καὶ διὰ τούτων
περὶ ἑαυτὸν ἵδρυσε τὰ πάντα, καὶ πάρεστιν ἀρρήτως πᾶσιν ἀφ’ ὅλων ἐξῃρημένος.
 Cf. Amph. Q.  (V, , –,  Westerink).
 Cf. Halfwassen, Plotin und der Neuplatonismus (as footnote  above) .
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I shall attempt to address these questions one by one, specifically emphasiz-
ing those points that are worthy of consideration.
In respect to the naming of God, we can now read Photius not only in con-
tinuity with the Cappadocian fathers, but also fully within the Neo-Platonic tra-
dition received via Dionysius. More precisely, it can be demonstrated that Pho-
tius transcended the Cappadocian model of ascribing equal value to both
Apophasis and Kataphasis¹²⁰ by adopting the Neo-Platonic way of radical apo-
phatism and transcendental negation (ὑπεροχική ἀφαίρεσις). In keeping with
the Dionysian tradition, this great Byzantine thinker declares with greater em-
phasis than the Cappadocians that the path of approaching God transcends
both negation and affirmation, while simultaneously considering God as beyond
any opposition. Unlike the Cappadocians, who consider God (in interpretation of
Exodus 3:14) as the real being (ὄντως ὄν),¹²¹ Photius, in full conformity with Di-
onysius,¹²² seems to assign an important role to Apophasis in defining God as
beyond being (ὑπερούσιον). By virtue of this definition Photius clearly denies
that it is possible for created being to define the essence of God, displaying a
conceptual concsistency with Plotinus. However, the Patriarch also tries to main-
tain a certain balance between the two ways of approaching God, namely be-
tween Apophasis and Kataphasis, by teaching on the outgoing processions of
the divine in a manner analogous to the Cappadocians and Dionysius on the en-
ergies.
Influenced by Plotinus and Dionysius, Photius appears to adopt the strict
notion of unity as the main property of being. The One is supremely intimate
with everything because nothing exists except by virtue of some sort of unity.
Lack of unity automatically means lack of existence. In this respect Photius
seems to amplify what he inherited from the Cappadocians’s cosmology on
the main characteristics of beings – contingency, qualitative change, and limita-
tion in time. According to Gregory of Nyssa, created being stands in need of an-
 In this context one must point out that Gregory of Nazianzus gives a certain priority to
kataphatic way of naming God than to apophatic. See Oratio ,, ed. P. Gallay. SC, . Paris
, –.
 Cf. Greg. Nyss., De Vita Moysis II , ed. H. Musurillo. Gregorii Nysseni Opera, VII/.
Leiden , ,. This view has great affinity with the Plotinian conception of Nous and is
equivalent to the second Hypothesis of Platos’ Parmenides according to Lilla, Neuplatonisches
Gedankengut (as footnote  above) .
 One can easily detect the difference between Gregory of Nyssa and Dionysius with respect
to the relarion between God and Being, if he compares their equivalent citations: τὸ πᾶσι τοῖς
οὖσι τὸ εἶναι παρεχόμενον, αὐτὸ δὲ ἀεὶ ὄν. Greg. Nyss., Beat. (Gregorii Nysseni Opera,VII/, ,
–); αἴτιον μὲν τοῦ εἶναι πᾶσι, αὐτὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν. Dion. Areop., Div. Nom. I  (, –).
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other (προσδεές or ἐνδεές),¹²³ which means that in order to maintain its exis-
tence it must partake of the real being. This participation keeps it alive in
both a moral and spiritual sense.¹²⁴ In addition, created being is subject to
change and alteration, since its very existence is due to a change, i.e., the tran-
sition from non-being into being.¹²⁵ Although mutability is primarily envisaged
as a negative (i.e., as an imperfection that makes the creature differ from its Cre-
ator), it can also be a vaulting-horse for the constant and limitless growth and
progress towards the Good.¹²⁶ The third characteristic of created being is its lim-
itation in time. It is stretched out within a certain dimensional extension (διαστη-
ματικῇ τινι παρατάσει) and is defined by a beginning and an end.¹²⁷
Did Photius adopt the Apophatic Theology and Henologie of Neoplatonism
to any significant degree? If so, this certainly does not occur at the expense of the
patristic view that God is eminently ‘personal’ in His nature. According to the un-
derstanding of Plotinus, the absolute One is not self-giving, even if it is causative,
because it is thoroughly impersonal. Everything somehow derives from the One,
yet the One gives nothing of itself. In Photius these traces of a latent Agnosticism
 Cf. De Vita Moysis II  (, .  Musurillo).
 Cf. De infantibus praemature abreptis (, – Hörner): ἡ μετουσία τοῦ ὄντως ὄντος
τοῦ ἀεὶ μένοντος καὶ ἀεὶ ὡσάυτως ἔχοντος, ἐν τὸ εἶναι φυλάσσει τὸν μετάσχοντα. See also De
Vita Moysis II  (, ).
 Cf. De hominis opificio , PG , CD: αὐτὴ γὰρ ἡ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι πάροδος,
κίνησίς τις ἐστι, καὶ ἀλλοίωσις τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι κατὰ τὸ θεῖον βούλημα μεθισταμένου …
τὸ διά κτίσεως γεγενημένον ἀπ’ ἀλλοιώσεως τοῡ εἶναι ἤρξατο καὶ συγγενῶς πρὸς τὴν τοιάυτην
ἔχει τροπήν.
 Cf. In canticum canticorum VI (, – Langerbeck): ἡ διὰ κτίσεως παραχθεῖσα εἰς
γένεσιν πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον ἀεὶ βλέπει τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῇ μετουσίᾳ τοῦ ὑπερέχοντος διὰ
παντὸς ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ συντηρεῖται καὶ τρόπον τινὰ πάντοτε κτίζεται διὰ τῆς ἐν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς
ἐπαυξήσεως πρὸς τὸ μεῖζον ἀλλοιουμένη, ὡς μηδὲ πέρας ἐνθεωρεῖσθαι μηδὲ ὅρῳ τινὶ τὴν πρὸς
τὸ κρεῖττον αὔξησιν αὐτῆς περιγράφεσθαι, ἀλλ’ εἶναι πάντοτε τὸ ἀεὶ παρόν ἀγαθόν, κἂν ὅτι
μάλιστα μέγα τε καὶ τέλειον εἶναι δοκῇ, ἀρχὴν τοῦ ὑπερκειμένου καὶ μείζονος – The other that
has been brought into being by creation, it constantly looks towards the First Cause of beings,
and is preserved in goodness by participation of the transcendent Being. Thus, in a certain
sense, it is constantly being created, ever changing for the better in its growth in perfection, so
that here too no limit can be found, nor its progressive growth can be limited by any term, but its
present state of perfection, no matter how great and perfect it may seem, is always merely the
beginning of a greater and superior stage.
 Cf. Greg. Nyss., Eun.  (I, , – Jaeger): ἀλλὰ μὴν τὰ ὑπὸ κατάληψιν ἡμετέραν
ἐρχόμενα τοιαῦτα ἐστιν, ὣστε πάντως ἤ ἐν διαστηματικῇ τινι παρατάσει θεωρεῖσθαι τὰ ὄντα ἤ
τοπικοῦ χωρήματος παρέχειν τὴν ἔννοιαν, ἐν ᾧ τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστον εἶναι καταλαμβάνεται, ἤ τῇ
κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὸ τέλος περιγραφῇ ἐντὸς γίνεται τῆς ἡμετέρας ἐπόψεως ἐπίσης καθ’
ἑκάτερον πέρας τῷ μὴ ὄντι περιγραφόμενα.
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in the name of radical transcendency¹²⁸ are not recognizable. The Patriarch ap-
pears here to be attached to the tradition of the Church Fathers, who see in God,
beside the essence, another aspect – the energeia or energies, which are nothing
less than God’s providential outgoings towards the creatures. Photius speaks
very clearly of energeia in Question 181. Energeia is synonymous with the creative
divine providence (δημιουργική πρόνοια) or the distribution of gifts (χαρισμάτων
διανομή) or the donation (δωρεά),¹²⁹ concepts one would not associate with an
impersonal God, but instead indicate a certain transcendent eminence of person-
hood.
Photius uses a variety of terms to describe this sort of ad extra motion of the
Deity. He speaks of αἴγλη and ἀκτῖνα,¹³⁰ of αὐγή and ἔλλαμψις,¹³¹ of πρόοδος,¹³²
terms that clearly go back to Dionysius, whose influence on later theologians,
such as Gregory Palamas,¹³³ is indisputable. Speaking of energeia the Patriarch
speaks of ‘a shared area’ of God, differentiated from another area that is not
shared, the divine essence. Through this crucial, in my view, distinction between
essence and energy, Photius offers us a paradoxical metaphysical scheme, which
he inherited from the Cappadocians and Dionysius the Areopagite, and accord-
ing to which God is inaccessible in some respects but nevertheless present in
others. This antinomy, God at once wholly unknownable, yet known and self-giv-
ing, is stated by Basil of Caesarea,¹³⁴ who acknowledged in God another aspect
in some way distinguishable from his essence – his operations in the world. He
considered them neither as substantial intermediaries nor as created entities, be-
lieving that these powers or energies are in no way themselves substances along-
side of God.¹³⁵ Moreover, these energies can in no way be revealing of the divine
essence. They lead the beings to an obscure, not to a full knowledge of it as they
form the basis for several notions derived about God, each of which has a name
that is applicable to Him and reveals a distinct aspect about Him. But all these
notions name aspects of God from a human point view. Conceptualizations of
 Cf. Halfwassen, Aufstieg (as footnote  above) .
 Cf. Amph.  (V , – Westerink).
 Cf. Amph.  (V , Westerink).
 Cf. Amph.  (V , Westerink).
 Cf. Amph.  (V , Westerink).
 Cf. R. Sinkewicz (ed.), The One Hundred and Fifty Chapters. Studies and Texts, . Toronto
, c. , p. , . .  (ἀκτίς) and c. , p. , ; c. , ,  (ἐλλάμψεις). See
also c.  and , p.  and p. , (οὐσιοποιός πρόοδος καὶ ἐνέργεια).
 See footnote .
 Cf. Adversus Eunomium I , ed. B. Sesboué. SC, . Paris , , –: πῶς οὖν τὸ
καταγέλαστον τὸ δημιουργικὸν οὐσίαν εἶναι λέγειν; ἢ τὸ προγνωστικὸν πάλιν ὡσαύτως; καὶ
ἁπαξαπλῶς, πᾶσαν ἐνέργειαν οὐσίαν τίθεσθαι;
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God describe God in relation to human beings.¹³⁶ Basil insists that there is no
initiatory term (λόγος μηνυτής) that can reveal and exhaust the divine mystery.¹³⁷
Gregory of Nyssa took up his brother’s outline and moved forward with it.
Gregory stated clearly that the sense (λόγος) of essence and of energy is not
the same.¹³⁸ Like his brother, Gregory asserted that the various names ascribed
to God are not contradictory,¹³⁹ since they point to different aspects of God’s cre-
ative activity. They also do not compromise the unity of His nature.¹⁴⁰ According
to Gregory, every name is a limited interpretation of the divine energy, and refers
to what it is conceived to be around the being (τὸ ἐπιθεωρούμενον τῷ ὄντι),¹⁴¹
circumscribing the thing without revealing its essence. It indicates the property
(προσόν) of being and explains the way of being (πῶς εἶναι) of every existing
thing.¹⁴² Thus the variety of names deriving from God’s activities have no nega-
tive effect on divine simplicity, for they are simply products of human reason
(ἐπίνοια) trying to find words for the outgoings (πρόοδοι) of God, not His es-
sence.
Pointing to the non-substantial or personal existence of the divine energies,
Gregory of Nyssa displays interesting parallels with Dionysius the Areopagite.
The Dionysian ‘πρόοδοι’ are not beings who stand in the middle between the
Deity and creatures somehow constituting an independent ontological order,
but instead are different aspects and modes of acting of the creative power of
God. One could say God is Wisdom-itself, Life-itself, Goodness-itself.¹⁴³ The
‘being-making processions’ (οὐσιοποιοί πρόοδοι), as Dionysius explicitly calls
them in the Divinis Nominibus,¹⁴⁴ are the reason why one could make general
 See M. Delcogliano, Basil of Caesarea’s anti-Eunomian theory of names. Christian theo-
logy and late antique philosophy in the fourth century trinitarian controversy. Supplements to
Vigiliae Christianae, . Leiden ,  f.
 Cf. Ep. ,, PG , B: οὐκοῦν ἄλλο μέν τι ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία, ἧς οὔπω λόγος μηνυτής
ἐξευρέθη, ἑτέρα δὲ τῶν περὶ αὐτὴν ὀνομάτων ἡ σημασία ἐξ’ ἐνεργείας τινὸς ἢ ἀξίας
ὀνομαζομένων.
 Cf. Eun. I  (, – Jaeger): οὐκ ὁ αὐτὸς τῆς τε οὐσίας καὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας ὁ λόγος. See
also Eun. II  (, – Jaeger).
 Cf. Eun. I  (, – Jaeger): οὐ γὰρ μάχεται πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ ὀνομάτα …
 Cf. Eun. I – (, – Jaeger): δυνατὸν εἶναι πολλὰς ἐφαρμόζεσθαι προσηγο-
ρίας κατὰ τὰς τῶν ἐνεργειῶν διαφορὰς καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὰ ἐνεργούμενα σχέσιν ἑνὶ κατὰ τὸ ὑπο-
κείμενον τῷ υἱῷ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὡς καὶ ὁ σῖτος εἷς ὢν ἐκ τῶν ποικίλων περὶ αὐτοῦ νοημάτων
διαφόρος ἐπωνυμίαις ἐπιμερίζεται.
 Cf. Eun. III V/ (, – Jaeger).
 Cf. Eun. III V/ (, – Jaeger).
 Cf. E.v. Ivánka, Plato Christianus. Übernahme und Umgestaltung des Platonismus durch
die Väter. Einsiedeln , .
 See V  (, – Suchla).
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statements about God, not in relation to His essence, but only with reference to
His external activity. Dionysius’s theological position on this issue is the follow-
ing: ‘You will find that what the Scriptures’ writers have to say regarding the di-
vine names refers, in revealing praises, to the beneficent processions (πρὸς τὰς
ἀγαθουργοὺς προόδους)’.¹⁴⁵ The variety of this activity is the reason why God
could be named simultaneously as nameless (ἀνώνυμος) with respect to His es-
sence, and polynymous (πολυώνυμος) because of His manifold theophanies in
beings.¹⁴⁶ The extroversion of God in Goodness extends itself relative to the ca-
pacity or incapacity of beings (κατὰ τὸν οἰκεῖον δυνάμενα λόγον) of grasping
Him.¹⁴⁷ The notion of analogy seems in this context to be very crucial in Diony-
sius just as it is in Photius.¹⁴⁸ God provides us with the ‘gnoseological’ signs (en-
ergies) and in that way enables us to speak of Him from our perspective, i.e.,
from the horizon of being, making statements about Him in proportion to our re-
ceptiveness. On this point the conceptual consistency with the views of Plotinus
are clearly recognizable. Plotinus in Ennead V 5 stated that although the all-tran-
scendent One is ineffable, we should still be allowed to name it to the best of our
ability (or rather inability), according to its meaning for us.¹⁴⁹ It is our inherent
need and desire that impels us to assign predicates to God, yet simultaneously
being conscious of the fact that we are far away from approaching the truth
and have no other means at our disposal except insufficient, constructed
names.¹⁵⁰ Thus ‘every ontological predication with respect to the absolute One
results from the transposition of the ability of being to assign accurately predi-
cations to that which, due to its transcendency, surpasses it. The content of every
predication derives not from the absolute One, but from the (level of) Being’.¹⁵¹
The core of this conceptual connection between Christian thought and Νeo-
platonism vis-à-vis the capacity of being to grasp the divine through the intellect
 Div. Nom. I  (, – Suchla).
 Cf. Div. Nom. I  (, –,  Suchla).
 Cf. Div. Nom IV  (,  Suchla). See also ibid. I  (,): ἀναλόγοις ἐλλάμψεσι. See
Schäfer, Philosophy (see footnote  above) . With reference to Gregory of Nyssa see above
footnote .
 See lines – in the text of Amph.  above (V , – Westerink).
 Cf. Enn. V , , –: ἀλλὰ ἡμεῖς ταῖς ἡμετέραις ὠδῖσι ἀποροῦμεν ὅ τι χρὴ λέγειν, καὶ
λέγομεν περὶ ῥητοῦ, καὶ ὀνομάζομεν σημαίνειν ἑαυτοῖς θέλοντες, ὡς δυνάμεθα. See also
Halfwassen, Aufstieg (as footnote  above), .
 Cf. Enn. VI , , –: τὸ μὲν ἀγαθόν, εἰ τὸ πρῶτον, ἣν λέγομεν τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν,
καθ’ ἧς οὐδὲν κατηγορεῖται, ἀλλ’ ἡμεῖς μὴ ἔχοντες ἄλλως σημῆναι οὕτω λέγομεν. Cf. also with
Dionysius, footnote .
 Huber, Sein (as footnote  above) . Compare with Photius Amph. , lines –:
ἀπὸ τῶν ὑστέρων παραληφθῆναι.
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could be summed up in the following statement of Dionysius: πάντα γὰρ τὰ θεῖα,
καὶ ὅσα ἡμῖν ἐκπέφανται ταῖς μετοχαῖς μόναις γινώσκεται. Αὐτὰ δέ, ὁποῖά ποτε
ἔστι κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρχὴν καὶ ἵδρυσιν, ὑπὲρ νοῦν ἔστι καὶ πᾶσαν οὐσίαν καὶ
γνῶσιν¹⁵² (Everything divine and even everything revealed to us is known only
by way of whatever share of them is granted. Their actual nature, what they
are ultimately in their own source and ground, is beyond all intellect and all
being and all knowledge). The statement above in no way compromises God’s
radical transcedency while simultaneously declaring that God gives out a
share of what is hidden. Both truths resonate with later Byzantine thought,
and especially the work of Gregory Palamas. In his distinction between the di-
vine transcendent being and the uncreated energeia, which is ‘divided indivisibly
(μεριζόμενη ἀμερίστως) according to the image of the sun’s rays that gives
warmth, light, life and manifests itself to the eyes of those who see’,¹⁵³ we can
detect the broader implications of the connection between Neoplatonism and
middle/late Byzantine thought. According to Palamas ‘the transcendent, su-
preme living, divine and good nature that is neither spoken of, nor conceived,
nor contemplated in any way because it transcends all things and is always ut-
terly inapprehensible and ineffable for all’,¹⁵⁴ provides us with tokens (συνθή-
ματα),¹⁵⁵ reflections (αὐγάς),¹⁵⁶ traces (ἴχνη)¹⁵⁷ of its presence that enable us to
form names about it derived from all things, albeit inexactly (καταχρηστικῶς)
and not in a proper sense (οὐ κυρίως).¹⁵⁸ ‛Thus it must be called both substance
 Div. Nom. II  (, – Suchla).
 Cap.  (, – Sinkewicz).
 Cap.  (,  – , Sinkewicz).
 Cf. Pro Hesychastis ,, ed. J. Meyendorff, Défense des saints hésychastes. Spicilegium
Sacrum Lovaniense, Études et documents, . Louvain , ,. See also Proclus, Theol. Plat.
II , ed. H.D. Saffrey / L.G.Westerink. Paris –, ,–: πᾶσι γὰρ ἐνέσπειρεν ὁ τῶν
ὅλων αἴτιος τῆς ἑαυτοῦ παντελοῦς ὑπεροχῆς συνθήματα, καὶ διὰ τούτουν περὶ ἑαυτὸν ἵδρυσε τὰ
πάντα, καὶ πάρεστιν ἀρρήτως πᾶσι ἀφ’ ὅλων ἐξῃρημένος.
 Cf. Pro Hesyhastis ,  (, Meyendorff). Compare with Photius footnote  above.
 Cf. Cap.  (,  Sinkewicz). Compare with Plotinus Enn. III ,  (II , – Henry/
Schwyzer); V ,  (III , – Henry/Schwyzer) and Photius, Question , (V , –
 Westerink): ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων ἡμῖν σύμβολά τινα καὶ ἴχνη ἡ ἄρρητος καὶ ἀνεπινόητος
θεότης τῆς ἐπιγνώσεως αὐτῆς ἐλλάμψαι προνοουμένη, διὰ τῆς τριαδικῆς οὐκ ἀπηξίωσεν
ἐμφανίζεσθαι θεολογίας.
 Cf. Cap.  (, – Sinkewicz). Compare with Plotinus Enn. II ,  (, – Henry/
Schwyzer): ὅταν λέγομεν τὸ ἕν, καὶ ὅταν λέγομεν τἀγαθόν … οὐ κατηγοροῦντας ἐκείνης sc.
Φύσεως οὐδέν; VI , (, – Henry/Schwyzer): τὸ μὲν ἀγαθόν, εἰ τὸ πρῶτον, ἣν λέγομεν
τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν, καθ’ ἧς οὐδὲν κατηγορεῖται, ἀλλ’ ἡμεῖς μὴ ἔχοντες ἄλλως σημῆναι οὕτω
λέγομεν. See also V ,  (, – Henry/Schwyzer); VI , (, Henry/Schwyzer): τῆς
πειθοῦς χάριν; VI , (, – Henry/Schwyzer): εἰ τις περὶ ἐκείνου sc. τοῦ ἑνός λέγων ἐξ
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and nature, but properly the substance-following procession and energy of God,
for the great Dionysius says that this is “the proper way for theology to name the
substance of the One Who truly is.’¹⁵⁹
The statement above makes clear that Palamas acknowledges, in full con-
formity with Neoplatonism, a certain limitation in approaching God’s reality
as a whole. He advances the view that even though a relation of correspondence
exists between what God truly is and what God reveals to us, certain limits
should be drawn when deducting conclusions from the level of being to the
level of that which is beyond being. It is true that there is a connection between
the inner Trinity and his activity ad extra and vice-versa. The flowing forth of the
divine reflects the intra-trinitarian relations, but this does not enable us from our
perspective (of being) to penetrate into the mystery of the divine and consequent-
ly draw conclusions on how he truly exists. Thus in Palamas’s view only the en-
ergeia of God is accessible to the creatures. According to theologians (e.g., Dio-
nysius) it is indivisibly divided, whereas the divine nature remains utterly
indivisible.¹⁶⁰ ‘How then can we draw near to God? By drawing near to his na-
ture? But not one of all created beings possesses or will possess any communion
in, or affinity to, the supreme nature. If then anyone has drawn near to God, he
has surely approached him by means of his energy.’¹⁶¹
The fundamental distinction between substance and energy, between God’s
inner being¹⁶² and His movement ad extra is generally accepted by the Christian
writers we have been examining.We can detect traces of it also in Neoplatonism.
This distinction also has an impact on trinitarian theology and, in particular, on
the issue of the procession of the Holy Spirit (i.e., the Filioque). An eventual sol-
ution to this problem lies exactly in establishing the relation of correspondence
between these two levels of ‘being’. The position of modern western theolo-
ἀνάγκης ἐνδείξεως ἕνεκα αὐτοῖς χρῆται, ἅ ἀκριβείᾳ οὐκ ἐῶμεν λέγεσθαι˙ λαμβανέτω δὲ καὶ τὸ
οἷον ἐφ’ ἑκάστου.
 Cap.  (, – Sinkewicz).
 Cf. Cap.  (, – Sinkewicz): πανταχοῦ ἀχωρίστως τῆς τε θείας οὐσίας καὶ θείας
ἐνέργειας, χωρητή ἐστιν ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργεια καὶ τοῖς κτιστοῖς ἡμῖν, ἐπεὶ καὶ μερίζεται ἀμερίστως
κατὰ τοὺς θεολόγους, τῆς θείας φύσεως ἀμερίστου παντάπασι μενούσης κατ’ αὐτούς. Cf. Div.
Nom. II  (,  Suchla).
 Cf. Cap.  (, – Sinkewicz): πῶς οὖν ἡμεῖς πλησίον τοῦ θεοῦ γενώμεθαϗ ἆρα τῇ
φύσει πλησιάζοντες αὐτοῦϗ ἀλλ’ οὐδεμίαν ἔχει ἢ ἕξει κοινωνίαν ἢ ἐγγύτητα πρὸς τὴν ἀνωτάτω
φύσιν τῶν κτιστῶν ἁπάντων οὐδὲ ἕν. εἴπερ οὖν τις γέγονεν πλησίον τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ
πάντως ἐπλησίασεν αὐτοῦ.
 We draw once more the reader’s attention to the fact that the word being in reference to
God is used by us inadequally and not strictly. See footnote .
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gians¹⁶³ passionately defends the possibility of drawing conclusions from the
level of economy to the level of theology (i.e., the inner-trinitarian relations).
They recall Augustine’s teaching that the Holy Spirit proceeds principally (prin-
cipaliter) from the Father, who nevertheless (analogously) in the creation consti-
tuted a common principle with reference to the Spirit together with the Son.¹⁶⁴
Furthermore, according to the same author the sending and the distribution of
the gifts of the Spirit by the Son to the world (Pentecost) gives us a clear indica-
tion that there must be an equivalent relation of origin between Son and Spirit at
the level of the immanent Trinity (cognosci quod ab illo procedat).¹⁶⁵
The same line of reasoning is to be found also in the writings of the Filioque
supporters in the 13th century who tried to convince their suspicious Byzantine
audience of the compatibility of Filioque with the orthodox Tradition. The ques-
tion raised by them was: ‘If the Holy Spirit exists in no way through the Son and
does not take His being through him, how does it happen that the Spirit shines
forth and is manifested through him, and that through the Son he is provided,
given and sent?’¹⁶⁶ To their mind the eternal manifestation and shining forth
of the Spirit through the Son was identified with his coming-into-being, just as
(analogically) the sun’s rays are brought forth by the sun. From the manifesta-
tion, giving, and sending of the Spirit they conclude the participation of the
Son in his hypostatic procession: ‘ The Holy Spirit is undeniably provided,
given, and sent through the Son, for he takes His being from the Father through
him’.¹⁶⁷
 See the discussion between E. Gräb-Schmidt and B. Oberdorfer in Marburger Jahrbuch
für Theologie  ( ).
 Cf. De Trinitate V/, : tatendum est patrem et filium principium esse spiritus sancti no
duo principia, sed sicut pater et filius unus deus et ad creaturam relatiue unus creator et unus
dominus, sic relatiue ad spiritum sanctum unum principium …’ (one should confess that Father
and Son are the principle of the Holy Spirit; not two principles, but, just as Father and Son are
one God and with respect to the creation one creator and one Lord, thus they are also one
(single) principle with respect to the Holy Spirit).
 Cf. Ibid., IV/, . See also Oberdorfer, Filioque (as in footnote  above) .
 Cf. Konstantinos Melitiniotes, Λόγοι ἀντιρρητικοὶ δύο, ed. M.A. Orphanos. Athens , f.
, (, –): εἰ μηδαμῶς ὑφίσταται δι’ υἱοῦ καὶ τὸ εἶναι δι’ αὐτοῦ λαμβάνει τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ
ἅγιον, πῶς ἀϊδίως ἐκλάμπει διὰ τούτου καὶ ἀναδείκνυται, πρὸς δὲ χορηγεῖται, δίδοταί τε καὶ
ἀποστέλλεται.
 Melitiniotes, ibid. f.  (, –,  Orphanos): ταῦτα πρὸς τῶν κάτωθεν εἰρημένων
παριστάνονται προδήλως τῆς ἀρειανικῆς τυγχάνειν ἀτεχνῶς μανιώδους αἱρέσεως· ἐπείπερ, εἰ μὴ
σαφῶς ὑπέκειντο τὰ διαληφθέντα, τὴν δι’ υἱοῦ φανέρωσιν τήνδε καὶ τὴν ἔκλαμψιν προσηκάμην
ἂν τὴν ἀΐδιον, ὡς αὐτὴν σημαίνουσαν δηλονότι τὴν ὕπαρξιν, καὶ μάλιστα τὸ ὥσπερ ἐκ τοῦ ἡλίου
διὰ τῆς ἀκτῖνος τὸ φῶς προσφυὲς παράδειγμα καὶ κατάλληλον, ἐξ ὧν καὶ τὴν εἰς ἡμᾶς χορηγίαν
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The movement from economy to the level of theology encountered strong op-
position from Patriarch Gregory of Cyprus, another important Byzantine author
of the 13th century, who dealt with the question of the procession of the Holy Spi-
rit. He argued the distinction between the unapproachable divine essence and
the uncreated, but participatory, energies of God. In his view only the energy
of God and nothing else can be an object of participation. The appeal to his pred-
ecessors, and especially to Dionysius, is striking. If we identify the inner being-
essence of God with his outgoings-energy, then do we not participate and have
communion with that essence? ‘And how then will his word be true, who says
that the Divine can be participated in only through the energies and the mani-
festations?’¹⁶⁸ In this matter Gregory vehemently argued against those who ex-
plained the existence of the creator in such a way that made Him equivalent
to how created things come into existence.¹⁶⁹ The way of being of God can in
no way be analogous to the way of being of creatures. There are certain ontolog-
ical limits that cannot be broken. All the above considerations provide a solid
ground for the claim that the crucial distinction between essence and energies,
between an aspect that is totally unknowable and another that is knowable,¹⁷⁰
and which goes back to the Cappadocian Fathers, is undeniably and firmly main-
tained by Photius, and then through him adopted by the Palamites. This distinc-
tion should be understood in a thoroughly paradoxical way – God is impartica-
ble in His essence but one can participate in His energies. This view is expressed
by Dionysius the Areopagite, Photius, and then Gregory Palamas, which gives us
a clear indication of the connection between Neoplatonism and Eastern Christi-
an Thought.We point once more emphatically to the last abstract of the text from
Amphilochia we have just examined: ‘From what has been said it is clearly pos-
sible to seek for some idea that God exists, and that he is the transcendent One
and Origin beyond Origin, supremely good, the Good as fountain of goodness;
other images and speculations, as was said at the beginning, being able to
καὶ δόσιν καὶ ἀποστολήν, ἔστερξα. Δι’ υἱοῦ γὰρ ἀναντιρρήτως χορηγεῖται καὶ δίδοται καὶ ἀπο-
στέλλεται τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, ὡς δι’ αὐτοῦ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ἔχον τὴν ὕπαρξιν.
 De processione Spiritus sancti, PG , D– A, with reference to Div. Nom. II  (,
– Suchla).
 Ibid. C: Πρὸς δὲ ταῦτα ἄλλος μὲν ἄν τις ἴσως ἔσχε σιγῇ βύσας καὶ τὰ ὧτα, μὴ θεμιτὸν
κρίνας πρὸς ἄνδρας, οἱ τοῦ ποιητοῦ τῆς κτίσεως ὕπαρξιν καθ’ ὁμοιότητα τῶν ποιημάτων τρο-
πολογοῦσιν. On this issue see Th. Alexopoulos, Die Argumentation des Patriarchen Gregorios II
des Kyprios gegen den Filioqueansatz in der Schrift De processione Spiritus Sancti, BZ 
() –.
 Cf. Cap.  (, – Sinkewicz): τοῦ θεοῦ τὸ μέν ἐστιν ἄγνωστον, ἤγουν ἡ οὐσία
αὐτοῦ, τὸ δὲ γνωστόν, ἤγουν πάντα τὰ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, τουτέστιν ἡ ἀγαθότης, ἡ σοφία, ἡ
δύναμις …
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drawn from posterior things, whereby it is possible to gaze upon that unattain-
able and indescribable beauty of the transcendent and supreme Deity …’.
The present study focused its attention on the philosophical and theological
analysis of selected passages from Photius’s Amphilochia trying to detect linguis-
tic and conceptual similarities between Neoplatonism and the so-called Christi-
an Platonism manifested in the Byzantine theology of the 9th century. More pre-
cisely, the study tried to show if, and to what extent, Neoplatonic elements
manifested themselves in the thought of Patriarch Photius, investigating the
broader implications of this connection on later Byzantine Fathers such as Greg-
ory Palamas. The analysis gives clear evidence that Photius adopted the so-
called Apophatic Theology and Henologie so characteristic of Plotinus and Dio-
nysius. The unanswered problem is the question of how these central elements
of Neoplatonic metaphysics were transmitted to Photius. The likely candidate is
Dionysius, maybe the most influential representative figure of so-called Christian
Platonism. Analysis of the text shows not only conceptual, but also verbal and
stylistic, similarities with the work of the Areopagite. It might have also been
transmitted directly through Photius’s study of Plotinian works, although textual
analysis argues for an indirect knowledge of Plotinian writings via Dionysius.
That is why the article in its title speaks of “echoes.” In order to come to a con-
clusion on this issue, focus should be paid to Photius’s interpretation of Aristo-
telian categories as compared to the thought of Plotinus. Such a study would be
an important contribution to the field of Patristics and could provide us with cru-
cial insight into the question of the relation between Photius and Plotinus. I
would encourage any scholar to undertake this effort.
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